DISPARITAS PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI TENTANG MODEL KESERENTAKAN PEMILU

Abstract

Constitutional Court (MK) Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 fundamentally altered Indonesia's simultaneous election design by separating national and regional schedules. This ruling triggered intense constitutional debate, as Decision Number 55/PUU-XVII/2019 previously established the election model as the legislature's open legal policy. Using a normative juridical method, this study analyzes the disparity between these rulings regarding open legal policy limits, legal reasoning quality, and constitutional impacts. The results demonstrate four key findings: first, the Court exhibited a disparity in stance, overstepping its authority by usurping the legislative domain to act as a norm-maker; second, the Court’s reasoning relied on non-legal considerations requiring further empirical research, such as institutional workload and voter fatigue, rather than pure unconstitutionality; third, the ruling creates a meaningful participation paradox, where the Court stripped the House of Representatives (DPR) of its authority over alleged public participation deficits, yet unilaterally decided the design behind closed doors while disregarding statements from the President and DPR; and fourth, this disregard threatens a transitional state-administration crisis, potentially causing a massive vacuum of leadership across hundreds of regions during 2029–2031. Consequently, this study recommends that the Constitutional Court uphold judicial restraint, and urges the DPR and the Government to promptly formulate transitional mitigation measures through an inclusive and participatory revision of election legislation