The Jokowi Government's Repressive Political Communication against Critical Opposition Groups

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***Abstract***

*Democracy has fundamental values related to civil liberties to express opinion, assembly and association. Freedom House data shows that starting in 2014, Indonesia has experienced a decrease in the civil liberties index from free to partly free. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) includes Indonesia in the category of flawed democracies with democratic values in 2016, 2017 and 2019 respectively, which are 6.97, 6.39 and 6.48 and are ranked 48, 68 and 64 of the 167 countries studied. This data is also reinforced by reports from Lokataru, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), Safenet, and surveys from the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI), Saiful Mujani Research and Consultant and (MSRC). The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) even gave a bad score for the category of civil liberties in opinion. The decline in democratic fundamental values was due to the actions of the Jokowi administration's repressive political communication which was manifested in the form of repressive legal products. The repressive political communication will be revealed using the Political Discource Analysis (PDA) approach. Repressive actions are carried out in order to perpetuate power and implement the economic ideology of the government in power. This research finally concludes that the political communication of the Jokowi administration's repression is a step backwards towards democracy and at the same time provides new data on political communication research. Texts are no longer limited to speeches, statements, comments, responses, and campaigns, but other texts have appeared in the form of legal products and actions.*

***Keywords:*** *civil liberties, representative political communication, repressive legal products , political discource analysis .*

1. **Preliminary**

One of the things that happened during the presidency of President Joko Widodo was the decline in civil liberties. The release of the Freedom House (an institution that consistently measures the civil liberties index of countries in the world (Jayani, 2019) states that there has been a decline from free (free) in 2006 to 2013 (Mujani, 2019) to partly free in 2014 to Currently, the measurement of civil liberties is related to three freedoms, namely: freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, and freedom in social media.

The decline in democracy index data in Indonesia, apart from being confirmed by international institutions, was also confirmed by a report from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) which released the results of the 2019 Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) in general, the results were 74.92 or classified as moderate. Of the 28 indicators assessed, there are six factors that are still below the 60.0 mark or are in the bad category. Of the six indicators, there are aspects of civil liberties, with indicators of threats or inhibition of freedom of opinion by the public through acts of violence (in 2018 it was 45.96, increased to 57.35 in 2019).

Repressive actions carried out according to Goldstein (1978 and 1983) aim to discredit a person, group, or organization because of differences in political views. Meanwhile, Davenport (2007) sees repressiveness as a regime response to domestic threats (Davenport, 1995). Davenport further explained the reasons for political leaders to use a repressive approach are: first, they do not have a viable alternative to exercising political control. Second, they will not be affected or consequently from the choice of repressive measures. Third, there is generally no effective mechanism to counter or check the power authority's coercive in government such.

In fact, the democratic system in politics in Indonesia does not eliminate the repressive behavior of the state, even though domestic legislation explicitly states the order to guarantee civil liberties in opinion, assembly and organization. The disclosure of repressive political communication for the Jokowi administration will take advantage of the Political Discource Analysis (PDA) theory. The use of PDA theory is inspired by what Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and Wodak have written. The three scientists gave direction that PDA will focus on discussing political action, political context, political history, political power, and political ideology (van Dijk, 1997; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). This disclosure is of course the key in PDA analysis because PDA's aim is to critically analyze emerging political discourses so that something very fundamental is revealed behind the text (statements, legal products, and actions) written or reported by government officials in relation to NGO reports, public response, and media coverage (government supporters and opposition).

1. **Metodologi Research**

Research with this critical paradigm approach was conducted using qualitative methods. The sample selection in this study used purposive sampling, which is sample selection based on suitability with the objectives and needs of the study (Herdiansyah in Cahyo, 2011). The data is taken from various texts that have been published on the internet and online media in 2014-2019 (the first period of President Jokowi's administration in 2014-2019 and the second current period of President Jokowi's administration in 2019-February 2021). Researchers select online media that meet the requirements of the Press Council as media that meet the standards of credible and accountable online media requirements based on Law Number 40 of 1999 concerning the Press.

The Press Council through the *https://dewanpers.or.id* page has published online media that has met the requirements of Press Council Regulation No.3 of 2019 concerning Press Company Standards which is a derivative of the Press Law. Some of the requirements for a press company are: first, being incorporated as a PT or other form regulated by law. Second, received approval from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Third, announcing the name, address, editorial contact, and the person in charge of the media. Fourth, the person in charge of the editorial staff must have the competence of the main journalist. Fifth, the person in charge for the editorial staff is not a political party administrator. Sixth, having a capital of at least IDR 50,000,000 and the ability to carry out company activities for at least 6 months.

With the announcement from the Press Council, it was easier for researchers to determine which *online* media was used as the source of data in this study because its validity, credibility and accountability had been tested. In addition, to ensure that the news on some *online* media is reliable information, the researcher cross-checks between media that have received the legitimacy of the Press Council so that the information that the researchers take is mu'tabar (calculated and trusted) information from various *online* media information.

Media coverage that was used as a source in this study was news from *kompas.com* (verified administration and factual by the Press Council on 17-06-2019), *detik.com* (verified administrative and factual by the Press Council on 04-09-2018), *kumparan.com* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on 04-09-2018), *tempo.co* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on *04-09-2018*), *tirto.id* (administrative and factual verified by Press Council on 06-08-2019), *liputan6.com* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on *04-09-2018*), *tribunnews.com* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on 04- 09-2018), *katadata.co.id* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on 10-01-2019), *beritasatu.com* (administrative and factual verified by the Press Council on 18-11-2020), *kontan.co.id* (verified administrative and factual by the Per Council s on 15-07- 2019), *viva.co.id* (verified factually and administratively by the Press Council on 04-09-2018).

The data collection technique used by researchers related to the Jokowi administration's repressive political communication was document study. In theory, Denzin (1979) has suggested that diary documents can be a source of research data. The technical step for data collection is to select, record, collect data (can be downloaded or other data collection efforts) which are considered repressive legal products (regulations or laws). Repressive legal products (regulations or laws) can be in the form of presidential decrees, government regulations, ministerial regulations, police chief edicts, police chief regulations, police chief circulars, attorney general announcements, attorney general regulations, and the like.

The technique of analyzing data conducted by researchers on data on the Jokowi administration's repressive political communication is by using the inductive method. The inductive method will move from specific facts to general themes and the researcher makes interpretations of the meaning of the data (Creswell, 2013). The data that has been collected as a product of repressive laws (regulations or legislation) is material to support the answers to the researchers' questions about what, why, how, and the consequences (effects) of the Jokowi administration's repressive political communications. At this stage, it is possible to do data disposal which is deemed irrelevant and add newly discovered data which according to the researcher becomes additional data to strengthen the answers to the research questions.

Answering research questions requires the ability to interpret data. It is in this data interpretation phase that a strong theoretical understanding is needed related to the political communication of the Jokowi administration's repression in relation to the fundamental values of democracy (particularly civil liberties, public space, and legal justice), political communication theory of repression, *Political Discource Analysis* (PDA) theory, and the ideology of the state apparatus. The step of interpreting the data is by dialoguing data which has been clustered into three groupings. Data interpretation will be complete and comprehensive using the *Political Discource Analysis* (PDA) approach because it will relate to context, history, power and ideology (van Dijk, 1997; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). The interpretation of this data will also reveal discursive politics which according to AS Hikam (in Latif and Ibrahim, 1996) is a space or place for conflicts of various interests, strengths, powers, hegemonic processes, and *counter* hegemony (*counter hegemony*).

**3. Research Results and Discussion**

**3.1 Jokowi Government's Repressive Legal Product**

**3.2 Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 16 of 2017 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations into Laws**

The DPR Plenary Meeting chaired by Fadli Zon on October 24 2017 finally passed the Perppu number 2/2017 into law through voting. The ratification was attended by 445 DPR members, 314 members agreeing and 131 members disagreeing. Of the ten factions in the House, the seven factions who received Perppu No. 2 Year 2017 is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Golkar Party faction, of the Democratic Party, the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), The National Democratic Party Faction, and the People's Conscience Party Faction. The Democrat Party, PPP and PKB stated that after being enacted as law, there would be revisions to the legislation program. The other three factions that rejected it were the Greater Indonesia Movement Party Faction, the Prosperous Justice Party Faction, and the National Mandate Party Faction (Wardah, 2017) .

Since President Joko Widodo issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations (Ormas) on July 10, 2017, polemics have been unavoidable. With this Peppu, the government does not need to follow the court process to dissolve a CSO which will take about 4-5 months. H al was considered contrary to Pancasila and violate the constitution (Wardah, 2017). The government feels that it is necessary to issue a paper to regulate freedom of opinion and association and to dissolve mass organizations that threaten the security and unity of the country. Meanwhile, the camp that rejects the perppu believes that this decision could destroy democracy and encourage the government to act authoritatively.

**3.2.1 Dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia ( HTI )**

Less than two weeks after the issuance of the Perppu No mor 2 of 2017 on 10 July 2017 , the government revoked the legal status of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The revocation of the legal entity status is based on the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number AHU-30.AH.01.08 of 2017 concerning the revocation of the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights number AHU-0028.60.10.2014 concerning the legalization of the establishment of a legal entity HTI association. Freddy said that the Ministry of Law and Human Rights had legal administrative authority in the rules for legalizing associations or societies (ormas). In addition, Kemenkumham also has the authority to revoke the status of mass organizations if they are considered to be contrary to the ideology and state law in Indonesia. With the revocation of the HTI Legal Entity Decree, HTI organizations were declared to be dissolved in accordance with Perppu Number 2 of 2017 Article 80A.

Menkopolhukam Wiranto explained three reasons for the government to dissolve HTI. First, in terms of national objectives, HTI (as a legal entity) does not play a positive role in the development process. Second, HTI has strong indications of carrying out activities that are contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as stipulated in Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Ormas. Third, HTI activities have caused clashes in society that can threaten public security and order, and endanger the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia (Movanita, 2017). This Perpu was finally passed into the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 16 of 2017 on November 22, 2017.

The government's interpretation and assessment unilaterally without giving HTI the opportunity to test it in the judiciary so that HTI can defend it, some human rights activists consider it an act that injures freedom of opinion, assembly and organization carried out by state officials with a tyrannical approach of power. Apart from the government's unilateral interpretation of mass organizations that are deemed to be contradicting Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the government also does not yet have concrete guidelines on indicators that serve as the basis for declaring violations and not violations. So everything is still at the subjective level of the government and cannot be tested. Article 59 Paragraph 4 Letter C Perppu CSOs stated that the meaning of the teachings and understand that contrary to Pancasila is atheism, communism, Marxism/Leninism or understand others are intended to replace or change Pancasila and the Constitution 45. Phrase or understand another that aims to replace and change The government is concerned that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be used to silence mass organizations that are opposed to the government.

Clear indicators of violating and contradicting Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are indeed very crucial to be used as an objective basis for assessing all activities, policies, and behavior of citizens or mass organizations in Indonesia because the Indonesian state is indeed formed from many differences united by deliberation to reach a consensus. It should be remembered, historically that the principles of Pancasila which are the philosophy of our nation are the result of a compromise by the founders of the nation, which consisted of religious groups and national groups. The seven words in the Jakarta charter, which were initially approved by BPUPKI, are still being rejected by groups outside Islam . A t last through a long discussion of the Founding Fathers, the Islamist group gave up seven words "divinity with the obligation to enforce Sharia Law adherents" is replaced by the Almighty God. This was chosen by the Islamic group for the sake of national unity and integrity.

From several experts (Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Refli Harun, Azyumardi Azra, Komarudin Hidayat, Hendardi, and Todung Mulya Lubis) who were invited by the DPR to give their views on the Ormas Perppu, it can be concluded that:

1. The government must carry out the due process of law (uij Hukum) so that if there are mass organizations deemed to be endangering the state, the government can file a trial. While in this perppu it was removed.

2. Since 1999 it has been agreed on the concept of check and balance so that there are no strong executives. With the issuance of this mass organization perppu, the government now wants to divert this.

3. It is very dangerous if the authority to dissolve mass organizations with legal status or not with legal entities lies with the government (in this case the coordinating minister for politics, law and human rights).

4. Article 5 Paragraph 4 of the Perppu Ormas which states that organizations are prohibited from developing, believing in, and adhering to ideas that are contrary to Pancasila are considered to have multiple interpretations.

5. If it is not in a compelling emergency and emergency condition, the state must take a court to examine the various arguments raised by the government against an organization that is deemed contrary to the law because there will be room for each party to present their arguments. (Prabowo, 2017).

Constitutional Law Expert Irman Putra Sidin considers that this is a bad precedent for the future of our democracy (Fachrudin, 2017). According to Irman, the dissolution of mass organizations has been clearly regulated in Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations. When the government has an indication that a mass organization has committed a violation, the first step is to give a warning or warning sent by the government up to three times. Then, there was the stage of stopping funding assistance, freezing the organization, and finally proceeding to the court. Irman suspects that the government chose a shortcut by issuing a perppu because of the difficulty of passing the dissolution mechanism stages. Of course this is not good for our democracy because the rules are in place and clear. According to Irman, the issuance of the perppu could threaten all existing mass organizations. Even though the intention of the issuance of this mass organization perppu is to dissolve only one or several mass organizations, the enforcement of this perppu is generally.

Such actions by the authorities will bring the Indonesian nation back to the pre-reform era, namely a dictatorial state. The seeds of government repression have emerged. If the government doesn't like something and the government doesn't want to obey the law, it can easily issue a perppu. The anti-Pancasila interpretation can differ from one regime to another and according to the tastes of the authorities. Ideally, the decision to dissolve an organization is made through the court. The government also does not have the authority to dissolve mass organizations without a decision from the court. Thus, the organization of the mass organization has the opportunity to defend themselves and present their legal arguments. In this Ormas Perppu, the process of applying administrative sanctions to mass organizations that commit violations is simplified. This measure has the potential to be used by the authorities as an instrument to repress groups that are hostile to the government (Hamid and Gammon, 2017).

**3.2.2 Dismissal of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)**

FPI was officially dissolved based on Joint Decree Number 220/4780 Year 2020, Number M.HH/14.HH05.05 Year 2020, Number 690 Year 2020, Number 264 Year 2020, Number KB/3/XII Year 2020, and Number 320 Year 2020 concerning the Prohibition of Activities to Use Symbols and Attributes and the Termination of FPI Activities. This SKB was signed by Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian, Minister of Law and Human Rights Yasonna Laoly, Minister of Communication and Information (Menkominfo) Johnny G Plate , National Police Chief General Idham Azis, Attorney General ST Burhanuddin, and Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) Boy Rafly Amar (*national.kompas.com*, 2020).

The contents of the decree stipulated on December 30, 2020 are 1. To declare that the Islamic Defenders Front is an organization that is not registered as a social organization, as regulated in laws and regulations so that it has de jure disbanded as a social organization. 2. The Islamic Defenders Front as a social organization that has de jure disbanded, in fact it continues to carry out activities that disturb peace, public order, and are against the law. 3. Prohibit the activities, use of symbols and attributes of the Islamic Defenders Front within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia 4. In the event of a violation as regulated in the third dictum above, law enforcement officials will stop all activities carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front 5. Requesting the public: a . Not to be influenced, engage in activities, use symbols and attributes of the Islamic Defenders Front. b. To report to law enforcement officials any activity using symbols and attributes of the Islamic Defenders Front. 6. Ministries / agencies that sign this Joint Decree should coordinate and take legal steps in accordance with statutory provisions. 7. This Joint Decree shall come into force.

The dissolution of Ormas on the basis of this decree shows the repressiveness of the government. Previously, when dissolving HTI, the government, wanting to avoid a complicated process, finally enacted the Ormas Law Number 16 of 2017 as a substitute for Law Number 17 of 2013. The dissolution of a mass organization should have consistently used the law that was just promulgated, but for FPI instead using a SKB. Even though Law Number 16 of 2017 requires that there must be a written warning for 7 days. If within 7 days the warning letter is ignored, it is followed by stage 2, namely the cessation of activities. After that, it can proceed with revocation of legal entity status and dissolution.

The different options for the dissolution of these 2 mass organizations show that on the government side it easily chooses the legal product that it wants to repress mass organizations, but on the other hand, the mass organizations do not have the right to defend themselves in court. This is of course a fundamental problem regarding the rules on freedom of opinion, assembly and organization whose legal references both nationally and internationally are very clear. This type of repression has contributed to the decline in the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI), which has been reflected in its decline since the beginning of Jokowi's administration.

**3.3 Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 of 2016 concerning Amendments to Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Electronic Information and Transactions**

There were 381 individual or institutional cases related to the ITE Law during 2011 to 2019 which were recorded by SAFENet Indonesia. Article 27 Paragraph 3 of the Law ITE on insult and defamation name of good or defarmasi be the highest use of the reporting. Hate speech reports Article 28 Paragraph 2 of the ITE Law ranks second. The editorial of these two articles does have a very flexible interpretation so that it is easy to use to trap people. Menkominfo Rudiantara acknowledged the existence of the rubber article but the government did not take the initiative to change it. The initial aim of the emergence of the ITE Law was to guarantee legal certainty for electronic information and transactions, but several articles actually have the potential to curb civil liberties in expressing thoughts and criticisms. The ruling regime is a group that always benefits and will be able to mobilize law enforcement officials to direct the interpretation of the criminalization of the rubber articles in order to benefit them.

In political years, the use of rubber articles usually increased (Scholastika, 2018). The ITE Law, which should have been used as a protector of the public interest, was misused to protect the interests of the ruling regime which wanted to criminalize, overthrow and frighten its political opponents. Newspaper.tempo.co (2020) notes that in 2017 Ropi Yatsman was sentenced to 15 months in prison by the Lubukbasung District Court, Agam Regency, West Sumatra, MFB (Ringgo) was sentenced to the Medan District Court in January 2018 with 18 months in prison. Both were prosecuted because they were considered insulting the president and the police chief. In 2019, the journalist who is also the founder of the Watchdog production house, Dandhy Dwi Laksono, was arrested and named a suspect in connection with his tweet about the Papua riots. Musician Ananda Badudu was arrested for transferring funds amounting to Rp. 10 million which was allegedly connected to the Papuan demonstration as well (Ani, 2019). Mohammad Hisbun Payu was raided by the Central Java Police on March 13, 2020 and detained for violating the ITE Law on Hate Speech.

Politicians who are opposed to Jokowi also feel the application of the ITE Law. Ahmad Dani, a politician from the Gerindra Party, was named a suspect in insulting Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Dhani was charged with insulting the authorities in Article 207 of the Criminal Code (Nailufar, 2016). Lieus Sungkharisma, a member of the Prabowo-Sandi National Winning Agency (BPN), was arrested and named a suspect on suspicion of spreading fake news and treason (CNNIndonesia, 2019). Permadi (a politician from the Gerindra Party), was questioned by the police in relation to Article 107 in conjunction with Article 110 in conjunction with Article 87 of the Criminal Code concerning treason attempts which had previously been accused of Kivlan Zein, Adityawarman, Ratna Sarumpaet, Firza Huzein, Eko, Alvin Indra, and Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, including Sri Bintang Pamungkas who is suspected of violating Article 28 paragraph 2 of Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Electronic Transaction Information in conjunction with Article 107 in conjunction with Article 110 of the Criminal Code concerning Public Incitement on Social Media (Nailufar, 2016). Eggy Sudjana, a PAN politician, was named a suspect in treason because of calls for people power (Erdianto, 2019).

Below is a list of some people who are critical and opposed to the ruling regime who have had legal consequences :



Meanwhile, some people who support the government, their legal cases are not processed and some are SP3. The table can be seen below:



**3.4 Decree on Handling Radicalism**

Joint Decree (SKB) of 6 ministries and 5 high state institutions related to the handling of radicalism in the state civil apparatus (ASN) was published on November 12, 2019 (Halim, 2019). The polemic that has been criticized by many community groups is the fifth point of the SKB which contains several types of violations, namely: the delivery of opinions on hate speech, the dissemination of opinions containing hate speech , assumptions or support as a sign of agreement with hate speech, deviant news and its dissemination, participation on actions contrary to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhinneka Tun ggal Ika, NKRI, and the government.

From the polemic above, several things that concern researchers are:

1. Regarding hate speech, the government already has Article 28 Paragraph 2 of the ITE Law on hate speech (although like the previous discussion, researchers also still note that the implementation of the ITE Law by law enforcement officials still tends to be used to suppress groups that are opposed to the government). The government should have focused on improving the content of the ITE Law if it was deemed not comprehensive. This overlapping regulation needs to be the focus of the government so that legal products in Indonesia are simpler, more efficient and credible. In terms of political communication, it will also show the authority of the government as a representative of the people who are mandated by law to be able to better manage this country.

2. Regarding supervision, the government actually already has institutions that can enforce this. Maximizing the inspectorate in each ministry, the ASN commission, and the Ombusman should be prioritized by the government rather than building a new system which is actually the task of an existing institution. If it is felt that an existing institution is not functioning properly, there must be an evaluation of the institution so that it can be decided whether the institution needs to be dissolved or can still be repaired. Determining the benchmarks for the success of a supervisory institution is important from the point of view of government political communication so that the public also understands that an institution that is paid from public money is functioning optimally or not.

3. Government personnel in a democracy are designed to be evaluated. This means of evaluation has been provided with elections every five years or monitoring through the people's representative council. Therefore, government personnel should build a credible evaluative political communication system so that the public is channeled properly if they experience dissatisfaction with government performance. The political elite (executive) oligarchy with the leadership of political parties (which ultimately affects the performance of political parties in the DPR) coupled with the oligarchy of media supporting the government have damaged democratic values. If the government protects itself with legal products that are made by themselves to build distance from the people, of course this is a step back from the democratic government system.

**3.5 Omnibus Law on Job Creation Bill**

Discourse Omnibus Law as a legal revolution jump was first mentioned by the President in his inauguration speech Jokowi as RI president for his second term, in 2019-2024, Sunday (10/20/2019) (Saputra, 2019). There are several clusters that are targeted in the Job Creation Bill for improvements, starting from investment, licensing, labor, research, government administration, sanctions, and land. During its development, the bill became a public polemic because it was considered to only facilitate foreign investment and harm workers.

Workers' unrest is inevitable because the philosophy of the Job Creation Law makes it easier for foreign investors to invest in Indonesia in droves. For this purpose, the government has made it easier for foreign workers to work permits, permits that have been hindering because they have been accelerated, trimmed and modified for a long time. Labor problems that have been troubling investors, such as labor wages, severance pay and employment status have been changed. Entrepreneurs will be spared from criminal sanctions, but it is enough to pay a fine or settle it in a civil manner (Setiawan, 2019). In addition, in the law there will be a licensing package that does not need an IMB and Amdal to be completed early.

Government steps to move quickly settle Law Copyright Labor Omnibus L aw without open dialogue and provide space enough various stakeholders key to examine in depth the legislation apparently is cumbersome government and lead to the negative stigma that the government is running a state system that is closed, authoritarian, and elite collectors only. Workers' groups are only asked for their opinions, but their input is not accommodated to become an important part of the content of the law. A t last, on the day of Monday, October 5, 2020 the House passed it into law. The PKS faction refused and the Democrat Party faction finally walked out of the DPR plenary session and declared no responsibility.

Labor groups together with student groups finally staged massive demonstrations throughout Indonesia. They stated that they rejected the application of the Job Creation Law which was considered to be very detrimental to the workers. Bad groups will also conduct a judicial review to the Constitutional Court (MK) to cancel the enforcement of the Job Creation Law. They will sue formally and materially. It is formal because he considers that the government is not open from the beginning of the drafting process to the process in the DPR which has already passed it, but apparently there are still many changes in the substance of the law. While the material, labor groups assess h ak their rights that previously existed in Law Number 13 Year 2013 on Manpower much reduced or even eliminated in order to facilitate investment into Indonesia.

**4. The Jokowi Government's Repressive Political Communication as a Presenter of Power and Smoothing the Government's Ideology**

**4.1 Custodian of Power**

The repressive political communication carried out by President Jokowi is an attempt to preserve power. Indications of the perpetuation of power are strengthened by data on an increase in political communication of repression that occurred before and during the presidential election campaign period and was imposed on critical and non-pro-government opposition groups. Several examples can be mentioned, among others: first, repression in the 212 movement and continued in the *#2019gantipresiden* movement. Second, the legal process in the group who were charged will makar (overthrow). Third, the conviction of opposition political figures such as Ahmad Dani, Lieus Sungkharisma, Permadi, Eggy Sudjana.

Repression is carried out by utilizing: first, the Criminal Code regarding insulting the president, treason attempts, and public incitement on social media. Both UU ITE, especially on defamation, contamination name of good, and hatred speech. These two laws are used as entry points to process the laws of individuals who are critical of the government. The law's meaning can indeed be based on the subjectivity of law enforcers and it is possible to use it for the interests of the authorities. Suspicion use law and security apparatus to suppress the opposition increasingly seen as a pro-government there are some people who do things that can be categorized as an insult, pollution of the name is good, and inciting people not processed quickly even tend to be left unprocessed . Meanwhile, opposition groups criticizing the government were quickly processed by the police.

According to Power (2018), the repressive actions carried out by Jokowi are in the authoritarian category because they use the power of state institutions, especially law enforcement instruments for group goals and perpetuation of power , including suppression of the constitutional rights of legitimate democratic opposition. Repression will always be related to the actions of the ruling regime against individuals and organizations (Goldstein in Davenport, 1995). When implementing repression, the ruling regime will usually automatically exercise its legal instruments (Gurr 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Seligson 1987; Mitchell).

**4.2 Smoothing Government Ideology**

The choice of government ideology (the ruling regime) can be seen from the policy choices taken by the government. The Ormas Law is clearly dedicated to dissolving HTI. Omnibus Law Copyright Work is dedicated to facilitate foreign investment into Indonesia by way of speeding up the process to obtain a business license, simplify business requirements, and eliminating barriers to investment. The government responded to investment barriers with discourses of deregulation, debureaucracy, strengthening of a liberal market mechanism, efforts to create a political atmosphere that was not noisy, reducing the complexity of the labor system, and the concept of cheap labor wages. Some of the data is sufficient to prove that the government has a capitalist neoliberal ideology.

Many of the ideologies carried out by the current government are in conflict with the ideology of Pancasila as the basic ideology of the nation and state which is outlined in the 1945 Constitution. Pancasila with its five fundamental values ​​is idealized as a basic conception (philosophy) of the state, world view, and ideology (Latif, 2018: 30). Pancasila values ​​not only fulfill the needs of a pluralistic Indonesian nation but also meet the needs of reconciliation in inter-national relations. Pancasila reconciliation is possible because historically the five principles of Pancasila are a synthesis (synthesis) of the diversity of beliefs, understandings, and developing hopes. In a democratic system, Pancasila always prioritizes the principle of deliberation and consensus. Decisions are not only determined by the number of the majority (majorocracy) or the power of the minority political elites of power holders who carry out oligarchies with entrepreneurs (minorocracy) but honor the deliberative rationality and wisdom of each citizen without discrimination (Latif, 2015: 49). The democracy adopted is not the majority vote that leads to liberal and totalitarian democracy but on the wisdom of wisdom in representative deliberations (Latif, 2015: 75).

**5. Conclusion**

The results of the discussion have provided comprehensive data on the repressive political communication of the Jokowi administration which is manifested in the form of statements, legal products, and actions. All this reinforces Fareed Zakaria's (2004) thesis that the implementation of democratization in a country does not prevent repression. From a democratic perspective it is a step backwards. Meanwhile , the political communication data of the Jokowi administration's repressive form of legal products and repressive actions are new data findings in the study of political communication using the PDA method.

**5.1 Political Communication of the Jokowi Government's Repression as a Step Backward for Democracy**

Jokowi's government repression has at least two conditions in order for it to run, namely first, the pillars of democratization, namely the executive, legislative, and mainstream media (quantitatively) have agreed to become a loyal coalition of supporters of the government. Under this condition, there is no process of checks and balances for the three functions, which will result in defects in democracy. Second, critical community groups (including personnel from opposition parties) are not strong enough to balance the strength of the coalition government supported by law enforcement officials who are facilitated by the existence of legal products that can be used to carry out acts of repression.

Jokowi has an interest in binding party elites and media elites so that all policies chosen are always approved by the legislature and are echoed massively and positively in the mainstream media. From the first to the second period, Jokowi has always maximized control of parliament and control of the mainstream media. After the parliament and the mainstream media can be co-opted, Jokowi can freely carry out the power, policy and ideological agendas in managing the government. Including repressive political communication measures against the opposition. The repressive political communication steps carried out by the Jokowi administration have at least two objectives, namely: first, efforts to maintain power in the current period of his leadership (first period) or the upcoming elections (Jokowi's second term) by suppressing the steps of political opponents so as not to enlarge and interfere with potential victories. Jokowi. Second, efforts to accelerate the chosen economic ideology so that it runs effectively on the grounds of improving the national economy which is claimed to be very beneficial to society, especially in relation to two big issues, namely increasing foreign investment and creating new jobs.

The repressive political communication chosen by the Jokowi administration also provides clues about the understanding of ruling democracy. The mandate of victory in democratic contestation is interpreted as a full democratic mandate for them to do various things that are necessary based on the consideration of the ruling elite group about political and economic choices that are considered the best for society without seriously building a good public space system so that they can hear the voice well. -different sounds to the choice of the ruling elite. This is what is meant as a step backwards for democracy because the authorities run a pseudodemocratic government (as if it were democratic because it won the public narrative in the mainstream media) when in fact it was built in a repressive way.

**5.2 Legal Products and Repressive Actions as New Data Findings in the Study of Political Communication using the PDA Method**

So far, political communication studies have presented and analyzed a lot of data related to the phrase "who said what". Today's development, the data barrier of 'who says what' in communication seems to be inadequate. When communication studies are combined with political studies into political communication studies, the facts are not limited to speech texts, statements, comments, responses, and campaigns but data have emerged in the form of legal products and actions. The researcher proposes the addition of the phrase "producing what" to accommodate data in the form of legal products and the phrase "doing what" to accommodate the actions of politicians and officials under their control. Researcher's study of repressive political communication provides details of the facts of this progress. Law products and politicians 'actions in linguistic studies can be categorized as text, but in political communication researches, the meaning of text has never discussed legal products and politicians' actions.

The pioneers of studies that connect communication and politics with the Critical Discource Analysis (CDA) method, namely Teun Van Dijk, Wodak, and Norman Faiclough, have also not yet brought up legal products and politicians' actions are categorized as text. Research on political communication of the Jokowi administration's repression using the Political Discource Analysis (PDA) method has guided researchers to find forms of political communication in the form of legal products and politicians' actions (not only the texts discussed by Teun Van Dijk (political language), Wodak (politicians and media). and Fairclough (politics and economics). This fact is also a new finding regarding the form of political communication research, namely in addition to statements, there are also data in the form of legal products and actions taken by politicians, including the apparatus under their control.

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