

The Phenomenon of Islamic Politics in Indonesia: Post-Islamism and the 2024 Elections

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia through the lens of the 2024 general election. By analyzing the performance of Islamic political parties and the factors influencing their success or failure, the study aims to provide insights into the evolving role of Islam in Indonesian democracy. Drawing on theories of post-Islamism and the adaptation of Islamic movements to democratic processes, the article explores how Islamic parties have navigated the challenges of a pluralistic society and engaged with a new generation of voters. The findings suggest that while some Islamic parties have successfully increased their influence by leveraging digital media and addressing contemporary issues, others have struggled due to internal conflicts and strategic missteps. The study contributes to the understanding of Islamic politics in Southeast Asia and its implications for democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Islamic politics; Islamic parties; 2024 election in Indonesia; post-Islamism; digital media; young voters

INTRODUCTION

Islamic politics in Indonesia has a long and complex history dating back to the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945. As the country with the world's largest Muslim population comprising approximately 87% of its total population of 270 million Indonesia serves as a unique laboratory for the interaction between Islam and politics within

the framework of the modern nation-state. Early debates over the role of Islam in the state system emerged during the drafting of the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945, by the Committee of Nine a document reflecting the aspirations of certain Islamic groups to embed Sharia values in the constitution. The Charter initially contained a controversial clause, “with the obligation to uphold Islamic sharia for its adherents,” which outlined a vision to make Islam one of the state’s foundational pillars. However, just one day after independence, the clause was removed following objections from non-Muslim groups particularly those from Eastern Indonesia who threatened to secede if sharia were made the basis of the state. This decision marked Indonesia’s first step toward a commitment to pluralism and inclusivity, which have become the main pillars of national identity. Nevertheless, the removal of the Sharia clause did not eliminate the tension between religious aspirations and secular principles, which continues to shape the dynamics of Islamic politics to this day (Omara, 2023).

The history of Islamic politics in Indonesia can be divided into several phases that reflect the evolution of its ideology, strategies, and influence within the national political landscape. In the early years of independence (1945-1965), Islamic parties, particularly Masyumi, played a significant role. Founded in 1945, Masyumi served as a platform for various Islamic schools of thought, ranging from modernists influenced by the ideas of Muhammad Abduh to traditionalists rooted in local religious practices. In the 1955 general election the first in Indonesia’s history Masyumi secured 20.9% of the vote, making it one of the largest parties in parliament. However, this success was short-lived. In 1960, President Sukarno dissolved Masyumi because it was deemed to be involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, a separatist movement that opposed the central government. This dissolution highlighted the early challenges faced by Islamic politics in balancing religious ideology with loyalty to the state, while also underscoring the vulnerability of Islamic politics to state intervention (Romli, 2024).

The New Order era (1966–1998) under Suharto’s leadership marked a period of systematic repression against Islamic politics. With military support and a focus on national stability and economic development, Suharto implemented policies that restricted religion-

based political activities. In 1973, the government forced all political parties to merge into three major groups: Golkar as the ruling party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) for nationalists, and the United Development Party (PPP) as an umbrella organization for Islamic parties. The PPP, which was a merger of parties such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Parmusi, and PSII, was not permitted to openly campaign on an Islamist agenda. Religious symbols in campaigns were banned, and in 1984, the government required all political and social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole guiding principle. This policy effectively weakened the political influence of Islam in the formal sphere, but on the other hand, it spurred the development of Islamic movements outside the realm of electoral politics. Mass organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, although no longer directly active in partisan politics at that time, strengthened their social bases through education, da'wah, and social activities, which would later become important assets for the post-Reform era resurgence of Islamic politics (Ansor, 2016).

The 1998 Reform Movement marked a significant turning point for Islamic politics in Indonesia. Suharto's downfall, triggered by the 1997 Asian economic crisis and pressure from student demonstrations, ushered in an era of multiparty democracy that allowed Islamic parties to flourish once again. Various new parties emerged with diverse characteristics and strategies, reflecting the plurality within Islamic politics itself. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which has its roots in the tarbiyah movement inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, offers a modern Islamic approach that appeals to urban and educated circles. PKS emphasizes cadre discipline, anti-corruption, and public service, making it popular among young voters and the urban middle class. The National Awakening Party (PKB), founded by Abdurrahman Wahid of NU, champions an inclusive Islamic vision that emphasizes pluralism, tolerance, and social justice, with a strong base among rural communities in East Java. The National Mandate Party (PAN), spearheaded by Amien Rais of Muhammadiyah, combines a moderate Islamic agenda with reform and anti-corruption issues, attracting support from intellectuals and activists. Meanwhile, the PPP, as the oldest Islamic party, is striving to maintain its traditional base in rural areas, despite facing internal challenges and fierce competition from newer parties. This diversity indicates that Islamic politics in Indonesia is no longer

monolithic but reflects a variety of schools of thought ranging from conservative to progressive as well as varied strategies for navigating electoral competition (Romli, 2024).

The 2024 general election serves as a key platform for observing the evolution of Islamic politics in Indonesia within the context of modern democracy. One of the main challenges facing Islamic parties is the changing demographics of the electorate. Approximately 60% of the total electorate is estimated to consist of young people who were born and raised in the post-Reform era and are connected to the digital world (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023). This generation, often referred to as Generation Z and Millennials, tends to be more critical, informed, and responsive to issues such as education, employment, climate change, and social justice, compared to traditional religious agendas like the formalization of Sharia law. This requires Islamic parties to adapt, shifting their focus from purely ideological narratives to practical solutions relevant to the needs of young voters. This challenge is compounded by growing skepticism toward identity politics, which during the 2019 general election sparked social polarization, particularly in Jakarta during the 2017 gubernatorial election (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024).

Advances in digital technology have also drastically transformed the political landscape. Social media platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, and X have become key tools in political campaigns, particularly for reaching young voters. Parties that are able to leverage these platforms with creative, interactive, and relevant content have a greater chance of winning support. However, digitalization also carries risks, such as the spread of misinformation, hate speech, and polarization, which can further inflame the political climate. In this context, Islamic parties must demonstrate the ability not only to survive in the digital arena but also to build narratives that are inclusive and non-divisive. The success of PKS in utilizing social media to attract young voters, for example, shows that technology can be an effective tool for Islamic politics when used with the right strategy (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024).

This article aims to analyze the phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia through a case study of the 2024 general election, focusing on the performance of Islamic parties, the factors influencing their success or failure, and the theoretical implications of the concept of

post-Islamism in the context of Indonesian democracy. The theory of post-Islamism, first introduced by Asef Bayat (2013), serves as the primary analytical framework. Bayat describes post-Islamism as the transformation of the Islamic movement from the ambition to establish a theocratic state toward participation in democracy, with an emphasis on social justice, human rights, and pluralism. In Indonesia, the characteristics of post-Islamism are evident in the more accommodative and conciliatory approach of Islamic parties toward socio-political realities, rather than a confrontational one. The concept of *the Islamic public sphere*, as outlined by Ansor (2016), is also relevant for understanding the internal dynamics of Indonesian Islamic politics, where contestation occurs not only between Islamists and secularists but also among Islamic schools of thought such as modernists, traditionalists, and neo-modernists.

The Indonesian context offers a unique perspective on the study of post-Islamism. Unlike countries such as Iran or Egypt, where Islamism often clashes with authoritarian regimes, Indonesia has a relatively stable democratic history and a highly pluralistic society. Islamic parties in Indonesia compete not only with secular parties but also with other Islamic parties that hold different visions. Post-Islamism in Indonesia is characterized by a rejection of the formalization of Sharia law, an acceptance of democracy as a political system, and an emphasis on more universal humanitarian issues, such as social justice and education (Qodir, 2023). The relevance of this research extends beyond national borders. At the global level, similar patterns are evident in countries such as Turkey, where the AKP Party combines Islam with neoliberal policies (Yavuz, 2009), or Malaysia, where PAS seeks to attract moderate voters without abandoning its ideological base (Funston, 2006). However, Indonesia stands out for its ability to integrate Islamic politics into a democratic system without triggering major conflicts.

This introduction provides a solid foundation for further analysis of how Islamic parties in Indonesia are navigating the challenges of the 2024 general election. By combining historical, theoretical, and contemporary perspectives, this article seeks to understand how Islamic politics continues to evolve within Indonesia's dynamic democracy.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of post-Islamism, as proposed by Bayat (2013), offers a robust analytical framework for understanding the transformation of Islamic movements in various global contexts, including Indonesia. Bayat defines post-Islamism as a paradigm shift from efforts to establish an Islamic state based on the formalization of sharia law toward active participation in the democratic process with a focus on social, cultural, and humanitarian issues. This shift does not signify a rejection of Islam as an identity or a set of values, but rather a reinterpretation of Islam's role in politics that is more inclusive and pragmatic. Post-Islamism emerged as a response to the limitations of traditional Islamism, which often failed to accommodate the pluralistic realities of modern society or faced resistance from secular and global forces. In the Indonesian context, post-Islamism is reflected in the way Islamic parties adapt to complex political and social realities, emphasizing social justice, human rights, and pluralism as core values, rather than pursuing a rigid theocratic agenda (Bayat, 2013).

In Indonesia's political landscape, post-Islamism possesses unique characteristics shaped by a long history of democracy, cultural pluralism, and the diversity of religious currents within Islam itself. According to Qodir (2023), post-Islamism in Indonesia is characterized by negotiation and accommodation, reflecting an approach that seeks to adapt to socio-political conditions without promoting confrontation with political authorities or secular groups. This approach contrasts with traditional Islamism, which in some countries such as Iran or Afghanistan focuses on the formal implementation of Sharia law through state structures. In Indonesia, Islamic parties such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Mandate Party (PAN) exhibit characteristics of post-Islamism by integrating Islamic values into broader political platforms such as anti-corruption, education, and social welfare that resonate with the needs of a pluralistic society (Qodir, 2023).

One complementary concept that enriches the analysis of post-Islamism in Indonesia is the "Islamic *public sphere*," as outlined by Ansor (2016). This concept highlights that Islamic politics in Indonesia involves not only a contest between Islamist and secular groups,

but also among different Islamic schools of thought, such as modernists, traditionalists, and neo-modernists. Modernists, represented by organizations such as Muhammadiyah, emphasize rationality, education, and religious renewal. Traditionalists, represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), uphold local religious practices while promoting tolerance and pluralism. Neo-modernists, often associated with the PKS's "Islamic Modernization), combine elements of modernization with a more global approach to Islam, inspired by movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. These dynamics create a vibrant Islamic public sphere, where Islamic parties compete not only for voter support but also to define the meaning of Islam in Indonesian politics (Ansor, 2016).

The main characteristics of post-Islamism in Indonesia, as identified by Qodir (2023) and Ansor (2016), can be summarized as follows:

1. Rejection of the formalization of Sharia: Islamic parties in Indonesia generally do not advocate for the formal implementation of Sharia at the national level, but rather focus on more universal Islamic values, such as justice and welfare.
2. Acceptance of democracy as a political system: Islamic parties accept multiparty democracy as a legitimate political mechanism and actively participate in elections and the legislative process.
3. Guarantee of political rights for all citizens: Post-Islamism in Indonesia emphasizes inclusivity, ensuring political rights for all groups, including non-Muslims, in accordance with the principles of Pancasila.
4. Emphasis on social justice and human rights: Issues such as education, health, and anti-corruption are prioritized, reflecting a commitment to the well-being of society as a whole.

This post-Islamism theory will serve as the primary lens for analyzing how Islamic parties in Indonesia adapt to contemporary political dynamics in the 2024 general election. The 2024 general election offers a relevant context for testing this theory, given the new challenges facing Islamist parties, such as changes in the voter demographic, the growing influence of digital media, and competition with increasingly powerful secular parties.

In the Indonesian context, post-Islamism is not only a political phenomenon but also a reflection of the social and cultural evolution of Muslim society. Since the 1998 Reformation, Islamic parties have demonstrated an ability to adapt to a changing political environment. For example, the PKB, rooted in the NU tradition, has successfully blended traditional Islamic identity with modern issues such as social justice and education. The PKS, with its neo-modernist approach, has attracted urban voters through anti-corruption campaigns and effective public services. The PAN, affiliated with Muhammadiyah, offers a platform that combines Islamic reform with a nationalist agenda. These three parties demonstrate how post-Islamism allows Islamic politics to remain relevant in a pluralistic democracy without becoming trapped in ideological dogmatism (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024).

However, this adaptation has not always gone smoothly. The United Development Party (PPP), as the oldest Islamic party, faces challenges in maintaining its relevance amid fierce competition and internal conflicts. The PPP's failure to clear the parliamentary threshold in the 2024 general election reflects the difficulties faced by some Islamic parties in adapting to changing times, particularly in attracting young voters who dominate the electorate (KPU, 2024). Young voters, who make up about 60% of the total electorate, tend to be more responsive to issues such as employment, education, and the environment than to traditional religious agendas (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023). Therefore, the Islamic parties that succeeded in the 2024 general election were those that were able to integrate Islamic values with practical solutions relevant to the needs of the younger generation.

A comparison with the global context enriches our understanding of post-Islamism in Indonesia. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exhibits characteristics of post-Islamism by combining an Islamist agenda with neoliberal economic policies, although in recent years it has tended to shift toward authoritarianism (Yavuz, 2009). In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) has sought to balance its ideological commitments with the need to attract moderate voters, particularly within the national political coalition (Funston, 2006). Unlike these two countries, Indonesia stands out for its high level of religious and ethnic pluralism and its

relatively stable democratic history. Post-Islamism in Indonesia is not only about adapting to democracy but also about navigating a highly diverse society, where Islam must coexist with other religions and secular values (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024).

The main challenge for post-Islamism in Indonesia is maintaining a balance between Islamic identity and the need to attract support from an increasingly diverse electorate. In the 2024 general election, Islamic parties face pressure to avoid divisive identity politics, as seen in the 2019 election, when religious issues fueled social polarization. The success of parties such as the PKB and PKS in leveraging social media to convey inclusive messages demonstrates that post-Islamism can serve as a tool to strengthen democracy, rather than weaken it. However, the risk of religious populism remains, particularly amid economic uncertainty and social tensions (Suryana, 2024).

Post-Islamist theory is also relevant for understanding how Islamist parties respond to changes in technology and communication. Social media has become a new arena for *the Islamic public sphere*, where Islamist parties compete to define their narratives. PKS, for example, is known for its strong digital presence, utilizing platforms such as Instagram and X to attract young voters with content that combines Islamic values with contemporary issues such as anti-corruption and education (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024). This approach reflects the flexible and responsive nature of post-Islamism in the face of social change.

Thus, the theory of post-Islamism provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing the dynamics of Islamic politics in Indonesia during the 2024 general election. By focusing on the adaptation of Islamic parties to democracy, pluralism, and contemporary challenges, this theory helps explain how Islamic politics can remain relevant in a modern context without losing its identity. This analysis also highlights the importance of understanding Islamic politics not only as an ideological phenomenon but also as a strategic response to social, political, and technological changes.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach using secondary data analysis to explore the phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia through the lens of the 2024 general election. The qualitative approach was chosen for its ability to provide an in-depth understanding of complex sociopolitical dynamics, particularly in the context of Islamic politics, which is characterized by a plurality of ideologies, strategies, and actors. Unlike quantitative approaches, which focus on cause-and-effect relationships through numerical data, the qualitative approach allows researchers to capture the nuances, context, and meaning behind the performance of Islamic parties in elections, as well as the factors influencing their success or failure (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Secondary data analysis was chosen for its efficiency in utilizing readily available sources, such as academic literature, media reports, and official data, which provide comprehensive insights without requiring time-consuming and resource-intensive primary data collection.

Research Design

This research design is based on document analysis, a qualitative method that involves the collection, organization, and interpretation of data from various written and digital sources. The primary focus of the study is the performance of Islamic parties in the 2024 General Election, as measured by their share of the vote and seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), as well as the factors influencing these outcomes, such as campaign strategies, the use of digital media, and internal party dynamics. The 2024 general election was chosen as a case study due to its relevance as a pivotal moment in the evolution of Islamic politics in Indonesia, marked by demographic challenges (young voters account for approximately 60% of the total electorate) and developments in digital technology that are transforming the landscape of political campaigns (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023).

This study adopts an explanatory approach, aiming to explain why and how Islamic parties achieved certain results in the 2024 general election. Using post-Islamism as an analytical framework, this study analyzes how Islamic parties such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party

(PAN), and the United Development Party (PPP) adapt to the realities of pluralistic democracy including within by competing with secular parties and appealing to young voters. This approach allows researchers to link empirical data to theoretical concepts, such as the rejection of the formalization of Sharia law, the acceptance of democracy, and an emphasis on social justice, as outlined by Bayat (2006) and Qodir (2013).

Data Sources

The research data sources fall into three main categories:

1. **Academic Literature:** Journals, books, and scholarly articles discussing Islamic politics, post-Islamism, and electoral dynamics in Indonesia. Publications from the past five years (2019–2024) are prioritized to ensure relevance, with sources such as *Studia Islamika*, *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, and *AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* serving as primary references. For example, an article by Qodir (2023) provides insights into the characteristics of post-Islamism in Indonesia, while Romli (2024) analyzes the electoral power structures of Islamic parties in the post-reform era.
2. **Media Reports:** News and analysis from credible media outlets, both national (such as Kompas, Tempo, and Detik) and international (such as Al Jazeera and The Jakarta Post), covering the performance of Islamic parties, campaign strategies, and political issues during the 2024 General Election. These media reports provide up-to-date context on political dynamics and public perceptions of Islamic parties.
3. **Official Election Data:** Official results of the 2024 General Election from the General Election Commission (KPU) of the Republic of Indonesia (KPU, 2024), which include the vote shares and seats won by Islamic parties in the House of Representatives (DPR). This data is supplemented by reports from international organizations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024), which provide a comparative overview of election results in Indonesia.

Data was collected from publicly available online sources, such as the KPU's official website, academic journal repositories (e.g., Google Scholar and JSTOR), and digital media archives. To ensure credibility, only sources with a verified reputation were used, and data

from multiple sources was cross-validated to avoid bias or inconsistencies. For example, the vote tallies for Islamic parties from the KPU were cross-checked with reports from the Inter-Parliamentary Union to ensure accuracy.

Data Collection Techniques

Data collection is conducted through a systematic process that includes several stages:

1. **Source Identification:** Researchers identify relevant sources based on keywords such as “Indonesian Islamic politics,” “2024 elections,” “post-Islamism,” and “Islamic parties.” Searches are conducted through academic search engines (Google Scholar, Scopus) and official websites (KPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union).
2. **Data Selection:** Data was selected based on the criteria of relevance, credibility, and timeliness. Priority was given only to sources published between 2019 and 2024, with the exception of classic theoretical references such as Bayat (2013). Sources lacking empirical data or in-depth analysis such as popular opinions without a factual basis were excluded.
3. **Data Organization:** Data is organized into thematic categories, such as electoral performance (vote share and seats), campaign strategies (digital media, mass mobilization), and internal factors (party conflicts, cadre development). Tools such as spreadsheets are used to record quantitative data, such as vote share, while narrative notes are compiled for qualitative data, such as media analysis.

This process ensures that the data collected encompasses a range of perspectives from official statistics to qualitative analysis thereby providing a holistic picture of Islamic politics in the 2024 General Election.

Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis was conducted using a qualitative content analysis approach, which involves interpreting and synthesizing data to identify patterns, themes, and relationships. The analysis steps include:

1. **Thematic Coding:** Data is categorized into major themes, such as “electoral success,” “party failure,” “use of digital media,” and “internal conflict.” Coding is done manually with the help of software such as NVivo to organize large datasets.
2. **Contextual Interpretation:** The data is interpreted within the context of post-Islamist theory, focusing on how Islamist parties exhibit characteristics such as a rejection of the formalization of Sharia law and an emphasis on social justice. For example, the PKS’s digital campaign strategy is analyzed as a reflection of a pragmatic post-Islamist approach.
3. **Triangulation:** To enhance validity, data from various sources (the General Elections Commission, journals, media) were compared to ensure consistency. For example, media reports on internal conflicts within the PPP were validated through an academic analysis by the Paramadina Public Policy Institute (2022).
4. **Synthesis:** The findings were synthesized to answer the research question: the factors influencing the performance of Islamic parties and their implications for Islamic politics in Indonesia.

This approach enables an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of Islamic politics, drawing on a wealth of secondary data to generate relevant and reliable insights.

Methodological Justification

A qualitative approach using secondary data analysis is considered most appropriate for this study for several reasons:

1. **Complexity of the Phenomenon:** Islamic politics in Indonesia involves complex interactions between ideology, political strategy, and social context. A qualitative approach allows researchers to capture these nuances, which are difficult to measure using quantitative methods.
2. **Access to Credible Sources:** The availability of credible open-source data, such as KPU data and academic journals, makes secondary data analysis an efficient and effective option. These sources provide sufficient data to analyze the performance of Islamic parties without the need for interviews or direct observation.

3. **Current Context:** The 2024 election is a recent event, so media reports and official data serve as the primary sources for understanding the latest dynamics. Secondary analysis allows researchers to respond to this event quickly.
4. **Theoretical Relevance:** Post-Islamist theory requires qualitative analysis to explore how concepts such as pluralism and social justice are translated into political practice. Secondary data from the academic literature provides a strong theoretical foundation for this analysis.

Methodological Challenges

Although this approach has many advantages, several methodological challenges must be acknowledged:

1. **Source Bias:** Media reports may contain editorial bias or sensationalism. To address this, researchers use reputable media outlets and validate information with other sources, such as KPU data or academic analyses.
2. **Limitations of Secondary Data:** Secondary data does not allow researchers to explore the direct perspectives of political actors, such as party cadres or voters. However, the wealth of data from open sources is sufficient to answer the research questions.
3. **Data Timeliness:** Since the 2024 General Election is a recent event, some data may not yet be fully available or verified at the time of the study. The researcher addresses this by using regularly updated official sources, such as the KPU website.
4. **Complexity of Interpretation:** The dynamics of Islamic politics involve many variables, such as economic, social, and technological factors. To maintain focus, this study limits its analysis to electoral performance and the key factors influencing it.

Research Ethics

This study adheres to the principles of research ethics, including transparency in data collection and analysis, as well as respect for the sources used. All data were obtained from publicly accessible open sources, thus raising no issues of confidentiality or privacy. Citations are provided accurately to acknowledge the work of other authors, and the

researchers strive to avoid bias in data interpretation by employing triangulation and cross-source validation.

Methodological Contributions

This methodology contributes to the study of Islamic politics in Indonesia by providing a systematic, evidence-based approach to analyzing the 2024 general election. By utilizing secondary data from credible sources, this study offers relevant insights into how Islamic parties are adapting to contemporary challenges, such as digitalization and demographic shifts. This approach can also be replicated for similar studies in other contexts, such as elections in other Muslim-majority countries, with adjustments as needed.

Thus, this methodology enables an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of Islamic politics in Indonesia, focusing on the performance of Islamic parties in the 2024 general election and its implications for the evolution of Islamic politics within a pluralistic democracy.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Findings

In the 2024 general election, eight political parties secured seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), including three Islamic parties: the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2024), the distribution of seats is as follows:

Table 1. Seat Distribution of Islamic Political Parties in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), 2019–2024 and 2024–2029

No	Party	Seats in 2019	Seats in 2024
1	PKB	58	68
2	PKS	50	53
3	PAN	44	48
4	PPP	19	0

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline Database and the General Elections Commission (KPU), 2024.

The PKB increased its seats from 58 in 2019 to 68 in 2024, the PKS from 50 to 53, and the PAN from 44 to 48. In contrast, the PPP failed to surpass the 4% parliamentary threshold, securing only 3.87% of the vote and thus failing to win any seats in the DPR (KPU, 2024). Factors contributing to the success of the PKB, PKS, and PAN included the use of digital media to attract young voters, who make up about 60% of the total electorate (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023). The PKB leveraged the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) network, while the PKS is known for its strong cadre development and effective digital campaigns (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024). The PAN, which is affiliated with Muhammadiyah, also successfully mobilized its support base. In contrast, the PPP faces challenges such as internal conflicts, failures in cadre development, and ineffective campaign strategies, including the decision to support a presidential ticket that is not well-aligned with its voter base (Paramadina Public Policy Institute, 2022).

Furthermore, the role of Islamist figures in the 2024 presidential election is limited, as analyzed by Suryana (2024). State repression under Joko Widodo including the dissolution of Islamist organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), as well as the arrests of figures like Habib Rizieq and Mohammad Al Khaththath has limited their role in the election. Their support is divided among the presidential candidates, with some backing Anies-Muhaimin but without the mass mobilization seen in previous elections (Suryana, 2024).

The 2024 elections will be a crucial test for Islamic parties in the context of Indonesia's democratic transformation, which is marked by complex social, technological, and political dynamics. As one of the world's largest democracies with a Muslim-majority population, Indonesia offers a unique laboratory for observing how Islamic politics evolves within a pluralistic system. Three key factors distinguish the 2024 elections from previous ones: the dominance of young voters, the use of digital media, and the fragmentation of Islamist support. These factors not only test the ability of Islamic parties to adapt but also reflect a paradigm shift toward post-Islamism, in which Islamic movements are transforming into

actors who fully participate in democracy, moving away from an agenda of formalizing Sharia law and focusing instead on social justice and welfare (Bayat, 2013). This analysis explores the successes of the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Mandate Party (PAN); the failure of the United Development Party (PPP); and the implications of these phenomena for Islamic politics in Indonesia, as well as their comparison with the global context.

Discussion

Key Factors in the 2024 Election

The Dominance of Young Voters

The 2024 elections were marked by the dominance of young voters, particularly Generations Z and Alpha (ages 17–40), who accounted for approximately 60% of the 204 million registered voters (KPU, 2024). These generations, which grew up in the post-reform era and are connected through digital technology, have political preferences that differ from those of previous generations. Unlike traditional voters, who may be more responsive to religious narratives or identity politics, young voters tend to prioritize practical issues such as education, employment, climate change, and government transparency (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023). This phenomenon requires Islamic parties to shift their strategies from a purely ideological approach to a platform that is more inclusive and relevant to the needs of the younger generation.

The success of the PKB, PKS, and PAN in the 2024 elections demonstrates their ability to navigate these demographic shifts. The PKB, for example, leveraged the network of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Indonesia's largest Islamic organization to reach rural voters, while also being active on social media to attract young voters. PKB's campaign highlighted issues such as education and welfare, which resonated with the aspirations of young voters. PKS, with a strong urban support base, is known for its disciplined cadre development and effective digital campaigns, offering anti-corruption solutions and bureaucratic reforms that appeal to Generation Z. PAN, affiliated with Muhammadiyah, focused its campaign on economic development and education, making it relevant to young voters concerned with social

progress. In contrast, the PPP has failed to adapt to these changes, with campaign strategies that still rely on traditional narratives and fail to appeal to young voters (Paramadina Public Policy Institute, 2022).

The Use of Digital Media

Advances in digital technology have drastically transformed the landscape of political campaigns. In the 2024 election, platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube have become key tools for conveying political messages, particularly to young voters. This shift is a response to changes in voter behavior, as voters increasingly rely on social media to obtain political information (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024). Parties that are able to leverage these platforms with creative, interactive, and relevant content have a competitive advantage in attracting support.

PKS stands out in its use of digital media, with a strong presence on Instagram and TikTok. The party uses content such as short videos highlighting social issues, humorous political memes, and live streams featuring young figures to build an emotional connection with voters. This strategy reflects a pragmatic post-Islamist approach, in which Islamic values are integrated with contemporary issues without emphasizing a Sharia agenda. The PKB is also active on social media, leveraging the popularity of NU figures such as Muhaimin Iskandar to attract the attention of young voters. PAN, though less aggressive than PKS, uses digital platforms to promote educational and economic programs that align with the aspirations of young voters. In contrast, PPP failed to effectively harness the potential of digital media, with unengaging content and minimal interaction with young audiences' factors that contributed to its failure to surpass the 4% parliamentary threshold (KPU, 2024).

The use of digital media also presents challenges, such as the spread of misinformation and polarization. However, the Islamist parties that succeeded in the 2024 elections demonstrated the ability to manage these risks by conveying inclusive messages and avoiding divisive identity politics. This approach aligns with the post-Theory of Islamism, which emphasizes democratic participation and pluralism as core values (Qodir, 2023).

Fragmentation of Islamist Support

The fragmentation of Islamist support has been a defining feature of the 2024 elections, particularly in the context of the presidential race. Islamist figures such as Habib Rizieq Shihab and Mohammad Al Khaththath, who previously wielded significant influence through organizations like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), face legal restrictions due to state repression under the administration of Joko Widodo. The dissolution of the FPI and HTI, as well as the detention of key figures, has limited their ability to mobilize the masses through traditional means (Suryana, 2024). Support from Islamist groups is divided among the presidential candidates, with some backing the Anies Baswedan–Muhaimin Iskandar ticket, but without the strong cohesion seen in the 2019 election.

The limited role of these Islamist figures reflects a shift in the dynamics of Islamic politics in Indonesia from charisma-based mobilization to a more institutional approach through political parties. The PKB, PKS, and PAN have successfully filled this void by offering more structured and inclusive political platforms. For example, the PKB leverages the NU's religious legitimacy to build support, while the PKS relies on strong cadre development and anti-corruption messaging. PAN, with its Muhammadiyah base, attracts voters through an agenda of reform and development. In contrast, the PPP has failed to capitalize on this fragmentation, plagued by internal conflicts and strategic decisions that are out of step with voter preferences such as its support for a presidential ticket that is unpopular among its own base (Paramadina Public Policy Institute, 2022).

The Success of PKB, PKS, and PAN

The success of PKB, PKS, and PAN in the 2024 General Election securing 68, 53, and 48 seats, respectively, in the House of Representatives demonstrates their ability to adapt to social and political changes in Indonesia (KPU, 2024). These three parties exhibit characteristics of post-Islamism by integrating Islamic values into a broader political platform such as education, welfare, and anti-corruption that resonates with young and pluralistic voters. The PKB leverages the NU network to reach rural voters, while using social media to attract urban voters. The PKS, with its neo-modernist approach, has successfully

focused on digital campaigns that highlight key issues. The PAN offers a development agenda that appeals to voters concerned with economic and social progress.

This adaptation aligns with post-Islamism theory, in which Islamic movements transform into actors who participate fully in democracy, shifting their focus from the formalization of Sharia law to the substance of justice and welfare (Qodir). Their strategy to avoid divisive identity politics which had polarized the 2019 general election also strengthens their position as inclusive democratic actors (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024).

The Failure of the PPP

Conversely, the failure of the PPP which secured only 3.87% of the vote and failed to win any seats in the House of Representatives reflects the challenges faced by Islamic parties that are unable to adapt to changing times (KPU, 2024). As Indonesia's oldest Islamic party, the PPP faces a number of structural and strategic obstacles. Internal conflicts, such as leadership rivalries and a lack of effective leadership development, have weakened the party's ability to formulate a cohesive campaign strategy. Furthermore, the PPP failed to transform its traditional Islamic ideology into a political platform that appeals to young voters, who are more responsive to issues such as employment and education. The PPP's strategic decisions such as its support for a presidential ticket that was unpopular among its voter base also contributed to its poor results (Paramadina Public Policy Institute, 2022). These failures underscore that an Islamic identity alone is not sufficient to win support in a modern democracy; parties must be able to offer solutions that are relevant and aligned with the aspirations of the people.

Implications of Post-Islamism

This phenomenon reinforces the idea that post-Islamism is a relevant paradigm for understanding Islamic politics in Indonesia. Unlike traditional Islamism, which focuses on the formalization of Sharia law, post-Islamism emphasizes democratic participation, pluralism, and social justice. The PKB, PKS, and PAN demonstrate these characteristics by offering platforms that integrate Islamic values with contemporary issues, such as education, health, and anti-corruption. This approach allows them to remain relevant in a pluralistic

democracy and attract support from a diverse electorate, including non-Muslims (Qodir, 2023).

A comparison with other contexts, such as Egypt and Turkey, shows that post-Islamism in Indonesia is unique due to its ability to integrate with pluralistic democracy without triggering significant polarization. In Egypt, Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood faced severe repression after briefly coming to power, illustrating the challenges of Islamism in an authoritarian context. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) adopted elements of post-Islamism by combining Islam and neoliberalism, but in recent years has tended to shift toward authoritarianism (Yavuz, 2009). Indonesia, with its relatively stable democratic history and highly pluralistic society, offers a more inclusive and accommodating model of post-Islamism, as acknowledged in part by Bayat (2013).

The Limited Role of Islamist Figures

The limited role of Islamist figures in the 2024 presidential election reflects a shift from charisma-based politics to a more institutional approach. State repression, including the dissolution of the FPI and HTI and the detention of figures such as Habib Rizieq, has diminished their influence. Although these figures still possess religious legitimacy and the ability to mobilize the masses, their support is divided among the presidential candidates, and they have been unable to generate a wave of mobilization like that seen in the 2019 election (Suryana, 2024). This shift has strengthened the role of Islamic parties as key actors in Islamic politics, with the PKB, PKS, and PAN taking over the role of mobilization through structured political platforms.

Implications for Indonesian Democracy

This phenomenon confirms that Islam and democracy can coexist in Indonesia. The Islamic parties that succeeded in the 2024 elections play a crucial role in strengthening pluralism and social justice, two main pillars of Indonesian democracy. By avoiding divisive identity politics and adopting a post-Islamist approach, these parties have demonstrated that political Islam can be a positive force in the consolidation of democracy. However,

challenges such as religious populism, intolerance, and social tensions remain, requiring attention to maintain democratic stability (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024).

In a global context, the success of post-Islamism in Indonesia offers valuable lessons for other Muslim countries. Unlike Egypt, where Islamism faces repression, or Turkey, where post-Islamism has shifted toward authoritarianism, Indonesia demonstrates that Islamic politics can be integrated into a pluralistic democracy through an inclusive approach. This model is relevant for countries such as Malaysia, where the party is seeking to attract moderate voters, or Tunisia, which is experimenting with democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia, as seen in the 2024 general election, reflects a significant evolution from an ideologically oriented movement toward a more pragmatic and inclusive form of democratic participation. The 2024 general election marked a crucial turning point in the history of Islamic politics in Indonesia, demonstrating how Islamic parties were able to navigate modern challenges such as shifts in the voter demographic, the digital revolution, and the fragmentation of Islamist support. This study confirms that Islam and democracy not only coexist in Indonesia but also reinforce one another, with Islamic parties playing a central role in strengthening pluralism, social justice, and democratic stability. The success of parties such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Mandate Party (PAN), as well as the failure of the United Development Party (PPP), provides valuable insights into the dynamics of Islamic politics within the context of modern democracy. Using the theory of post-Islamism as an analytical framework, this study highlights how Islamic politics in Indonesia continues to evolve, offering important lessons for democracy in other Muslim countries.

The evolution of Islamic politics in Indonesia, as seen in the 2024 general election, is marked by a shift from rigid ideological agendas such as the formalization of Sharia law toward a more flexible approach focused on social and humanitarian issues. The theory of

post-Islamism, proposed by Bayat (2013), provides a relevant framework for understanding this transformation. Post-Islamism describes Islamic movements that participate fully in the democratic process, abandoning theocratic ambitions and focusing on social justice, human rights, and pluralism. In Indonesia, the characteristics of post-Islamism are clearly evident in the strategies of successful Islamic parties. The PKB, with its Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) base, integrates traditional Islamic values with modern issues such as education and welfare, attracting support from both rural and urban voters. PKS, with its neo-modernist approach, stands out in digital campaigns highlighting anti-corruption and bureaucratic reform, resonating with young Generation Z and Millennial voters. PAN, affiliated with Muhammadiyah, promotes an agenda of economic development and education, making it relevant to voters concerned with social progress. These three parties demonstrate the ability to balance Islamic identity with the needs of a pluralistic democracy, as outlined by Qodir (2023).

The success of Islamic parties in the 2024 general election will depend heavily on their ability to adapt to the demands of the times, particularly in attracting young voters, who make up 60% of the 204 million registered voters (KPU, 2024). Generations Z and Alpha, who grew up in the digital and post-reform era, have political preferences that differ from those of previous generations. They tend to be more critical of ideological narratives and more responsive to practical issues such as employment, education, climate change, and government transparency (Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta, 2023). PKB, PKS, and PAN have successfully tapped into these aspirations by offering relevant political platforms and leveraging digital media such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube to convey their messages. PKS, for example, uses short videos and political memes to build an emotional connection with young voters, while PKB capitalizes on the popularity of NU figures to boost its visibility on social media. PAN, though less aggressive, focuses on content highlighting its education and economic programs. This approach reflects post-Islamist pragmatism, in which Islamic parties not only survive in electoral competition but also expand their support base beyond traditional voters (Hidayat & Wibowo, 2024).

Conversely, the failure of the PPP which secured only 3.87% of the vote and failed to win any seats in the House of Representatives highlights the challenges faced by Islamic parties that are unable to adapt (KPU, 2024). Internal conflicts, a lack of effective leadership development, and an inability to transform traditional Islamic ideology into a political platform that appeals to young voters were the main factors behind the PPP's failure. Strategic decisions that were out of step with voter preferences such as backing an unpopular presidential ticket further undermined the party's position (Paramadina Public Policy Institute, 2022). The PPP's failure underscores that an Islamic identity alone is insufficient to win support in modern democracy; parties must be able to offer relevant solutions that resonate with the aspirations of an increasingly diverse society.

This study confirms that Islam and democracy can coexist in Indonesia, a finding with significant implications for the consolidation of democracy in Muslim-majority countries. The Islamic parties that succeeded in the 2024 general election played a crucial role in strengthening pluralism and social justice, two key pillars of Indonesian democracy. By avoiding divisive identity politics, as seen in the 2019 general election, the PKB, PKS, and PAN have demonstrated that Islamic politics can be a positive force in expanding democratic inclusivity and stability. Their post-Islamist approach, which emphasizes democratic participation and universal values, has enabled these parties to attract support from a diverse electorate, including non-Muslims, as outlined by Chaplin and Jurdi (2024). This phenomenon contrasts with experiences in some other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, where Islamism faces severe repression, or Turkey, where the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) post-Islamist approach has shifted toward authoritarianism (Yavuz, 2009).

The success of post-Islamism in Indonesia also offers valuable lessons for the global context. Compared to Malaysia, where the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) struggles to balance Islamist ideology with the need to attract moderate voters, Indonesia presents a model of Islamic politics that is more integrated with pluralistic democracy (Funston, 2006). This model is relevant for countries such as Tunisia, which is experimenting with democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring, or Morocco, where Islamist parties participate in the parliamentary system. Indonesia's uniqueness lies in its ability to manage religious and

ethnic pluralism without triggering major conflicts, largely thanks to the accommodative approach of its Islamist parties, which aligns with the principles of Pancasila.

Nevertheless, Islamic politics in Indonesia is not without its challenges. The risks of religious populism, intolerance, and social polarization remain, particularly amid economic uncertainty and political tensions. The 2019 election demonstrated how identity-based political narratives can divide society, and although the 2024 election showed a decline in polarization, this potential should not be overlooked (Suryana, 2024). Furthermore, the fragmentation of Islamist support marked by the limited role of figures such as Habib Rizieq Shihab highlights the need for Islamic parties to continue strengthening their institutional bases. State repression of Islamist organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) also raises questions about the balance between national security and religious freedom, which may influence the future dynamics of Islamic politics.

For further research, several avenues can be explored to deepen our understanding of Islamic politics in Indonesia. First, the long-term impact of Islamic parties' digital strategies needs to be studied further, particularly in terms of how social media influences voter behavior and the formation of public opinion. This research could employ quantitative methods, such as sentiment analysis on digital platforms, to complement qualitative approaches. Second, the influence of Islamic politics on public policies such as education, health, and poverty alleviation need to be analyzed to understand the tangible contributions of Islamic parties to national development. Third, a comparative study with other Muslim-majority countries, such as Malaysia or Tunisia, could provide insights into the factors that support or hinder the integration of Islamic politics into democracy. Fourth, the internal dynamics of Islamic parties such as leadership development and conflict management need to be explored to understand why some parties, such as the PPP, have failed to adapt.

The policy implications of this study are also significant. The Indonesian government may consider strengthening regulations on digital media to reduce the risks of misinformation and polarization, while still safeguarding freedom of expression. Additionally, support for political education among young voters can boost democratic participation and reduce vulnerability to populist narratives. For Islamic parties, a focus on inclusive leadership

development and the creation of political platforms oriented toward the needs of the community will be key to maintaining their relevance in the future.

Overall, the 2024 general election confirms that Islamic politics in Indonesia has reached a new stage of maturity, marked by a pragmatic and inclusive post-Islamist approach. By leveraging digital media, appealing to young voters, and avoiding identity politics, Islamic parties have strengthened their position as key actors in Indonesia's democracy. This phenomenon not only enriches the discourse on Islam and democracy but also offers a model that can serve as inspiration for other Muslim-majority countries. By continuing to adapt to the changing times, Islamic politics in Indonesia has the potential to become a progressive force in advancing social justice, pluralism, and public welfare.

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