

Between Sharia and Secularism: The Dynamics of Ideological Conflict in the Formation of the Indonesian State

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to analyze how two ideological blocs emerged at the beginning of independence, namely Islamic nationalism and secularism, which led to the ratification of the Jakarta Charter. The change in the first principle regarding Islamic law for its adherents to Belief in One God sparked debate at the BPUPKI session. There were changes in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution in Article 6 paragraph (1), as well as negotiations on the revision of the first principle, coupled with the long-term impact on Islamic politics. This study applies a descriptive analysis method with data collection techniques through literature study. The purpose of this analysis is to provide an organized and accurate description of the facts and characteristics of the object or phenomenon being studied, as well as to analyze and detail the literature related to the topic being studied. The conflict between the two sides with different views began at the beginning of Indonesia's independence during the BPUPKI session. The two parties were Islamic Nationalists who wanted the formation of an Islamic state and Secular Nationalists who longed for a national state. From this intense debate, several changes occurred in the foundations of the Pancasila state, the 1945 Constitution, and the formation of the nine-member committee.

Keywords: Islamic Nationalists, Secular Nationalists, State Foundations, Political Ideology, Pancasila, Jakarta Charter.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, as a nation that gained independence in 1945, faced monumental challenges in formulating a state foundation that could unite its extraordinary diversity, both ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and especially religiously. The moment of independence was not merely a transfer of power from the colonizers, but the culmination of a long struggle and the starting point for the formation of a national identity. The process of forming this identity raised a fundamental question that

troubled the nation's founders: what kind of state foundation would become the basis of the Republic of Indonesia. This question gave rise to deep tensions between two main schools of thought that reflected the socio-cultural reality of Indonesian society at that time. There was a strong aspiration from most Muslim leaders and communities to place Islamic law as the main source or at least have a significant influence in the constitution and state affairs. This aspiration was based on the fact that the majority of Indonesia's population was Muslim, as well as the belief that Islam was not only a ritual religion, but also provided a comprehensive legal system and set of values to regulate social and state life. The Jakarta Charter, agreed upon by the Nine Committee on June 22, 1945, became concrete evidence of this aspiration by including seven crucial words: "with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents."

Developing strong thought to establish a state secular that strictly separates religious affairs from state affairs. Secularization can be understood as a process in which humans free themselves from the influence of religion or metaphysical beliefs that have limited their way of thinking and speaking. In this process, the world is no longer understood based on religious teachings or similar belief systems, but begins to be interpreted independently without the interference of sacred elements. Secularization also eliminates closed worldviews and removes supernatural stories and religious symbols. As a process of change, secularization gives rise to secularism, which is a system of values or ethics based on universal morals that do not depend on religious teachings or beliefs in the supernatural. This system emphasizes the importance of the world and the changes that occur within it, and encourages the understanding that everything continues to change naturally.

In the political context, secularization is known as the desacralization of politics, which is the separation of religion and political power. In a secular society, political power cannot be based on religious doctrine or symbols of divinity. Political legitimacy must come from the people or the political actors themselves, not from claims of divine revelation or authority. Therefore, a state or government that claims to be based on God's will is considered illegitimate according to secular principles. The political world should be managed based on rational considerations and mutual agreement, not on religious doctrine.

This concept of secularism does not mean being anti-religion, but rather emphasizes the neutrality of the state in matters of religion, guarantees freedom of religion for all citizens, and bases the laws and policies of the state on rational consensus and universal humanity, not on specific religious doctrines. Supporters of this view, consisting of secular nationalist figures, socialist thinkers, and leaders of minority religious groups, argue that only a secular state can guarantee equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion, prevent the domination of one group over another, and be an effective glue for a highly diverse nation such as Indonesia. This dynamic is not merely an abstract philosophical debate, but a reflection of Indonesia's complex socio-political reality, its colonial legacy, the influence of global thinking, and the struggle to find an ideal post-colonial form of state. Understanding this intense ideological struggle is not only important for reconstructing the history of our constitution, but also provides a critical lens for understanding the roots of various contemporary debates regarding the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia, which continue to echo to this day.

Conceptually, Islamic ideology can be understood as a belief system derived from Islamic teachings that aims to regulate all aspects of human life, including spiritual, social, economic, and political matters. In the context of Indonesian history, Islamic ideology refers to the idea that the state and society should be organized based on the principles of Islamic teachings, including in the legal system, government, and public ethics.

Ideological Struggles in the Formation of the Foundations of the State

The ideological battle between supporters of an Islamic state and secularists during the formation of Indonesia's founding principles is a central theme in Indonesian political historiography. George McTurnan Kahin's work in *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (1952) provides an overview of the revolutionary dynamics in Indonesia, including the debates in the BPUPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) sessions, although it does not specifically highlight the dialectic between Islam and secularism. Herbert Feith, in *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (1962), states that this ideological tension has colored the political structure of Indonesia since its independence. A number of studies then began to highlight more

systematically the role of Islam in politics, such as Deliar Noer's *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (1973), which traces the intellectual roots of the modernist Islamic movement. B.J. Boland, in *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (1971), reinforced this analysis by highlighting the political struggle of Muslims in the context of nationalism and state formation.

The BPUPKI Session, Pancasila, and the Role of Key Figures

The debate in the BPUPKI session on the foundations of the state became a crucial point in the history of the Indonesian constitution. The primary documents compiled by Mohammad Yamin in the Draft Preparatory Document for the 1945 Constitution (1959–1960) became an important source in tracing the arguments of the key figures. Adnan Buyung Nasution in *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia* (1992) explains that the failure of the Constituent Assembly in the 1950s cannot be separated from the same ideological tensions, namely the battle between the visions of an Islamic and secular state. Robert Elson, in *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (2008), describes Pancasila as the result of a compromise from this conflict in order to form an inclusive national identity. A deeper understanding of this process can also be obtained through the biographies of key figures such as Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Natsir, and Wahid Hasyim. The works of Lambert Giebels, Cindy Adams, Mavis Rose, Audrey Kahin, and Iskandar Nugraha show how the intellectual backgrounds and political strategies of these figures influenced the course of the debate and the direction of national decisions.

The Jakarta Charter, Comparative Perspectives, and Contemporary Research

The moment when seven words were added to and deleted from the Jakarta Charter became the focus of a number of important studies. Endang Saifuddin Anshari in *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945* (1997) and R.M.A.B. Kusuma in *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (2004) describe in detail the compromise process that took place and its impact on the relationship between religion and the state in the constitution. In addition, comparative perspectives from other Muslim countries such as Turkey through Soner Cagaptay's work *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey* (2006) and the collection of essays *Political Islam* (1997) enrich our understanding of similar issues in a global context. Recent research, such as that conducted by Rémy

Madinier in *Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (2015) and Kevin W. Fogg in *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution* (2019), shows that these dynamics are not limited to the center of power but also permeate the regions. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in the analysis for further research on the strategic interactions between figures supporting Islamic and secular ideologies in formal forums such as the BPUPKI, including how negotiation strategies and conflict resolution produced the final synthesis in the form of Pancasila.

Research Objectives

This paper aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of the intense ideological struggle that took place during the formation of the Indonesian state, particularly during the sessions of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Investigation Committee (BPUPKI) and the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) in 1945. The main focus of this study is to understand how the debate between two different visions of the state unfolded and developed: one vision sought to make Islamic law the basis of the state or at least give it a special position in the legal system, while the other vision emphasized a secular state with a strict separation between religion and state affairs. This paper aims to comprehensively explore the interactive process that took place in these sessions, including how conflicting arguments were presented and how political strategies and rhetoric were used by key actors to respond to such deep ideological pressures.

Furthermore, this paper also seeks to clearly identify the historical and political context behind the emergence of this debate and examine its impact on the formulation of the basic principles of the state, which eventually became Pancasila. The author seeks to trace how the process of negotiation and compromise between groups with differing views shaped the direction of a pluralistic and inclusive Indonesia. Through this analysis, it is hoped that a more complete understanding can be gained of how the discourse on Islamic ideology and secularism is not merely a theoretical conflict, but rather a dialogue that has determined the political and state character of Indonesia to this day. In addition, this paper also aims to show the relevance of the ideological debate in 1945 to contemporary issues that are still hotly debated, namely the relationship between religion and the state in modern Indonesian political life.

RESEARCH METHOD

In an effort to explore the historical dynamics and thinking behind the process of establishing the foundations of the Indonesian state, this study utilizes descriptive analysis with a literature review approach as the primary technique for data collection. This approach was chosen because it is in line with the nature of the issues being studied, namely historical events and ideological conflicts that cannot be captured through direct observation, but must be done through a review of existing written documents.

This study applies descriptive analysis by utilizing information gathering techniques through literature study. The objective of descriptive analysis is to present an orderly and accurate representation of the reality and characteristics of the object or phenomenon being studied. This approach is taken so that researchers can communicate ideas, theories, and data relevant to the core of the research comprehensively and in detail.

In data collection, the technique applied is a literature study. Through this technique, researchers will analyze and describe literature related to the topic being studied, which is then described in accordance with the issues raised. Information is obtained through searching various relevant literature sources, such as books, scientific articles, journals, official documents, and other academic sources that support the analysis of the research topic. The literature search process is carried out systematically, while considering the credibility and relevance of the sources to the issues being discussed. This research will be organized into several interconnected subchapters, starting from historical background of the emergence of two ideological blocs, the bpupki session, and the jakarta charter, ideological negotiations and compromises and long-term political impact.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The Indonesian people's struggle for independence was the dream of all those who wanted to see it come true. It was natural for there to be differences of opinion regarding the strategy for the struggle for independence in a discussion forum. On June 22 1945, Indonesian independence leaders from various backgrounds and religions entered into a "social contract" agreeing that the Indonesian state that would be

proclaimed independent and implemented in the future would not be a religious state nor a secular state, but rather a unitary state "based on belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents." However, this was not approved by some circles and led to a debate that eventually resulted in a change.

Where the Jakarta Charter agreed not to remove the word "Ketuhanan" but to replace it with "Ketuhanan Yang maha Esa" (Belief in One God). This National Consensus was agreed upon and signed by the *Founding Fathers*, including the nine-member committee of the Indonesian State, in a charter called the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945. The Jakarta Charter, which has been ratified, is a form of discussion between the Nationalist group and the Islamic group involved in the drafting of the 1945 Constitution at the BPUPKI.

The formulation of the Jakarta Charter was carried out through lengthy discussions and deliberations, accompanied by heated debates, but ultimately a solution was reached and agreed upon for the sake of unity and harmony among the nation's leaders. The process of formulating and ratifying the Jakarta Charter underwent several changes. This was a dynamic process that involved various pressures, conflicts, and threats, until a middle ground was finally reached, which is now known as the Jakarta Charter.

Overall, the content of the Jakarta Charter is the same as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution that we know today. The difference lies in the formulation of the first principle of Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter, which contains seven very historic words, namely:" (Belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents). Meanwhile, in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution that we know today, these seven very historic words have been omitted. Instead, the word "Yang Maha Esa" (The One and Only) has been added to the principle of Belief in God, making it "Belief in God, the One and Only."

The emergence of the debate on the relationship between religion and the state occurred in Indonesia, namely during the pre-independence period, which began with the debate between Soekarno and Muhammad Natsir. Soekarno, who lived from 1901 to 1970, stood with the neutral nationalist group, while Mohammad Natsir, who lived from 1908 to 1993, stood with the Islamic group. Both represented two conflicting ideologies, namely nationalism and Islam. Soekarno believed that religion and state

should be separate, while Natsir held the view that Islam does not recognize a separation between religion and state; the two are one and the same.

Ultimately, the debate over the relationship between religion and the state was brought before the BPUPKI during discussions on ideology, which ultimately agreed that Pancasila would be the ideology of the nation. This eventually led to a rebellion by Kartosuwiryo and Kahar Muzakkar during the Old Order. Then, in 1966, to prevent further debate on the relationship between religion and the state at the beginning of the New Order regime, Suharto issued a regulation establishing Pancasila as the sole principle. This is because "Belief in One God," the first principle of Pancasila, is the main foundation of the Indonesian state, and is very important and forms the basis for the other principles. However, at the beginning of independence, not everyone agreed with the formulation of this first principle. Debates and major changes occurred during the process of forming the first principle, especially regarding the diversity of religions and cultures in Indonesia.

During the preparations for independence, there was an ideological conflict within an institution known as BPUPKI (Indonesian Independence Preparatory Investigation Committee). Here, ideological conflict refers to the political-ideological relationship between religion, especially Islam, and the state at that time. During the session, two camps emerged, Islamic Nationalists and Secular Nationalists, which were opposed to each other. They discussed topics such as the ideological and constitutional basis of the state, whether the president must be Muslim, whether Islam should be the official religion of the state, whether the state should have an institution to enforce Islamic law, and the possibility of designating Friday as a national holiday.

Most of the foundations of the Indonesian state, Pancasila, originate from the Jakarta Charter. The Jakarta Charter was formulated by the founders of the state who were members of the PPKI. The task of this committee was to formulate the foundations of the state. From this point, the debate between the two camps became increasingly heated, which led to the formation of the nine-member committee.

Table 1. Members of the nine-member committee

No	Name	Affiliation
1	Soekarno	Secular Muslim nationalist

2	Muhammad Hatta	Secular Muslim nationalist
3.	Muhammad Yamin	Secular Muslim nationalist
4.	Ahmad Soebardjo	Secular Muslim nationalist
5.	A.A. Maramis	Secular Muslim nationalist
6.	KH. A. Wahid Hasyim	Islamic nationalist from Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)
7.	H. Agus Salim	Islamic nationalist from Syarikat Islam (SI)
8.	Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso	Islamic nationalists from the Islamic Association (SI)
9.	Abdul Kahar Muzakkir	Islamic Nationalist from the Islamic Party (SI)

Source: Compiled by the author based on *Risalah Sidang BPUPKI dan PKI* (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1945) and Kahin (1952).

The Jakarta Charter, drafted by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Investigation Committee (BPUPKI), originally read "Belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents." This sentence explicitly recognized Islam as the state religion and required Muslims to apply Islamic law. However, representatives from eastern Indonesia, which was predominantly non-Muslim, such as from Maluku and Papua, strongly opposed this formulation. They argued that it could lead to discrimination against other religions because it did not reflect the religious diversity in Indonesia. Due to political pressure from eastern Indonesia and the different religions in the archipelago at that time, the first principle of Pancasila had to be changed. Eastern Indonesia, such as Maluku, Papua, and East Nusa Tenggara, is inhabited by people who are mostly Christian and follow local religions. Therefore, they considered that the original wording of the first principle, which included the phrase "with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents," did not fully reflect the religious diversity in Indonesia. This pressure was not only in the form of verbal rejection, but also posed a significant threat to the unity of the new state. During the PPP and PKI sessions, representatives from the regions expressed their objections and demanded that the state's foundation not favor any particular religion, so that Indonesia's pluralistic society could be accepted.

This political pressure arose from concerns that if the Kingdom insisted on implementing Islamic law, injustice and discrimination against non-Muslims would be tolerated. In the political context at that time, Indonesia was struggling to become an

independent and inclusive country, and any formula that was considered exclusive had the potential to cause conflict that could be exploited by parties who wanted to hinder independence. As a result, such political pressure challenged religious sovereignty and could damage national unity. Regional and international political dynamics also influenced this pressure. Eastern Indonesia has strong social and cultural ties with neighboring countries whose populations are predominantly non-Muslim and who want the new country to respect diversity and freedom of religion. This pressure was further strengthened by the desire of individuals and communities in the eastern region not to become a marginalized minority in the new country.

Given the current political backdrop, the foundation of the state must be a meeting point that involves all Indonesians. To maintain the unity and integrity of the nation that is being built, representatives from the eastern region demanded that the first principle not contain elements that only support one religion. This is the main reason why the phrase "with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents" was ultimately removed and replaced with the more universal phrase, "Belief in One God," which can fairly include all religious adherents in Indonesia.

The wording of the first principle was modified through a process of negotiation and agreement between the ulama and the nationalists, with Mohammad Hatta, vice president of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and a key figure in the Indonesian independence struggle, playing an important role in resolving these differences.

Hatta asked Muslim leaders such as K.H. Wahid Hasyim and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo to discuss the issues raised by the non-Muslim delegation. By changing the wording of the First Principle of Indonesian Unity, the leaders of the National Islamic Alliance demonstrated a wise and pragmatic approach. They understood that religious issues in the national context could be discussed further after independence. It was important to ease tensions and build consensus among people with different ideologies and beliefs.

Before the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) meeting on August 18, 1945, intense negotiations took place. In informal conversations, the phrase "with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents" was removed and replaced with the phrase "Belief in One God." The first principle is now more open and

can represent all religious communities in Indonesia with this change. The value of divinity was not eliminated by this change in wording; on the contrary, it became broader so that it could be accepted by all religions and beliefs in Indonesia. Therefore, the first principle serves as a pillar that is able to maintain religious harmony and tolerance and become the philosophical basis of a pluralistic state.

The consensus reached on the amendment to the first principle was an important moment in the history of Indonesia's independence. All parts of the nation agreed that "Belief in One God," the last principle in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, was the legitimate foundation of the state. This agreement demonstrates the values of tolerance and inclusion that characterize Indonesia. However, research shows that the first principle of Pancasila is often systematically marginalized, which has an impact on the other principles of Pancasila. The first principle, which is positioned as the number one foundation of the state, has great power to drive the thoughts and actions of society, but it can also be used politically to cause tension and conflict. To overcome this problem and to protect the other principles and maintain peace among religious communities, some researchers have proposed changing or reinterpreting the first principle. One example is the proposal to change the first phrase from "Belief in God, with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents" to "Belief in One God," which is an inclusive religion and does not marginalize other religions.

After a series of hearings conducted by the BPUPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) from late May to mid-July 1945, as well as hearings by the PPKI (Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee) in August 1945, President Soekarno proposed a number of changes to the content and position of the Jakarta Charter in the draft constitution. Some of the important points that were changed include:

1. The term "Mukaddimah" was changed to "Pembukaan" (Preamble) to be more in line with commonly used language.
2. The sentence that originally read "Based on the belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents" was simplified to "Based on the belief in One God" to reflect the spirit of unity in a diverse society.
3. In Article 6 paragraph 1, the requirement that the President must be Muslim was

removed, leaving only the provision that the President must be a native Indonesian.

4. The adjustment in the second point was also applied in Article 29 paragraph 1 relating to religion.

The changes to the Jakarta Charter after the proclamation of independence were an important milestone in the process of establishing the constitutional foundations of the Indonesian state. One of the fundamental changes was the removal of the phrase "*with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents*" from the Jakarta Charter, which was then confirmed in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution on August 18, 1945. As a consequence, the first principle of Pancasila was reformulated as "*Belief in One God*." This change gave rise to a concept of the state that was unusual in modern political theory.

Indonesia has chosen to be a country that does not fully align with the Western concept of secularism, which emphasizes a complete separation between religion and the state. However, it also does not adhere to a form of theocracy in which religion is the main basis of the system of government. In this context, secularism does not mean a total separation between religion and the state, but rather a form of balance between recognition of religious values and inclusive principles of statehood. One of the main characteristics is formal recognition of the existence of God and the importance of religion. This is reflected in the ideology of Pancasila, especially the first principle which emphasizes the principle of "*Belief in One God*". Within this framework, every citizen is expected to adhere to one of the official religions recognized by the state, indicating that spirituality is a normative element in civic life in Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia does not adhere to a religious state, even though the majority of its population is Muslim. The state's neutrality towards religion affirms that no single belief is exclusively used as the ideological foundation of the state. Religion also has a significant position in social life and national education. The education system in Indonesia requires the teaching of religion according to the religion embraced by the students. Another characteristic is the rejection of atheism and ideas that reject religion. The state does not give legal recognition to views that question the existence of God or openly oppose religion. This shows the limits of secularism in Indonesia, which still requires religious diversity as a social and political norm.

Pancasila serves as a compromise between religious and secular tendencies. Thus, the state does not subject public law and policy entirely to one religion, but also does not negate the moral influence of religious teachings. Pancasila functions as a space for consensus that unites various ideological groups in society. The state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to practice their respective religions. This protection is part of the fulfillment of human rights, not the implementation of specific religious laws. In addition to changes in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, revisions were also made to Article 6 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. Initially, this article stated that the President must be a native Indonesian and a Muslim. The phrase "*and be a Muslim*" was removed to avoid discrimination against citizens from other religious backgrounds who meet the leadership requirements. This revision reflects a commitment to the principles of equality and open nationality. Thus, the state is inclusive of plurality of beliefs, while still maintaining spiritual values in the administration of state affairs.

The important changes made to the Jakarta Charter, particularly the removal of the phrase requiring the application of Islamic law for its adherents, as well as the adjustment of Article 6 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, had a profound impact on the existence of Islamic law within the framework of the Indonesian state. Since then, Islamic law no longer has explicit legitimacy in the constitution. Its application is limited to personal religious matters, such as marriage, inheritance, and dispute resolution in religious courts. This situation has led to legal uncertainty, which has influenced the political struggles of Islamic groups in subsequent periods.

During the Liberal Democracy period (1950–1959), Islamic groups such as the Masyumi Party and Nahdlatul Ulama chose to fight through formal political channels. They participated in elections, sat in parliament, and were actively involved in the process of drafting the foundations of the state in the Constituent Assembly. One of their main agendas was to fight for the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter as part of the constitution. However, in a highly competitive political atmosphere full of tug-of-war between various ideological forces, these aspirations failed to achieve a national consensus. Islamic parties were relatively less influential than secular-nationalist groups, which rejected the formalization of Sharia law in the constitution. Failure

This triggered the emergence of two approaches within the Islamic movement. On the one hand, there were those who were willing to accept Pancasila as the final ideological foundation of the state, and they then shifted the focus of their struggle towards strengthening Islamic values in the social and cultural dimensions. On the other hand, there were groups that remained consistent in fighting for the formalization of Sharia law within the framework of democracy, even though they had to face considerable political challenges.

The situation became more complex during the Old Order era (1959–1965), especially after President Soekarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly and replaced the political system with Guided Democracy. Under this system, state power became highly centralised and authoritarian, with a tendency to remove political forces that were considered potentially disruptive to the stability of the government. Parties such as Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) were dissolved by the government because they were deemed to be opposed to the state's ideological policies.

According to Warkum Sumitro, these developments show that the implementation of Islamic law was greatly influenced by the dynamics of political power. Islamic law did not develop autonomously, but was often limited by the interests of the state. One clear indicator of the weakening of Islamic law can be seen in the position of the religious courts, which during the Old Order did not have independent power. Religious court decisions were only considered legally valid if they had been ratified by a district court. This signified the subordination of Islamic legal institutions within a national legal system dominated by a secular approach.

The New Order regime led by President Suharto emerged as the dominant force after the collapse of the Old Order. The New Order government consistently showed resistance to efforts to revive independent Islamic political forces, such as the Masyumi Party. The military, as the main pillar of Suharto's power, also openly opposed the return of this party. As a form of controlled political compromise, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi) was established in 1968. However, the government continued to restrict the party's organizational structure by prohibiting the involvement of senior Masyumi figures, rendering the party nothing more than a state-controlled political instrument to suppress expressions of political Islam.

This containment strategy reached a higher intensity through a policy of political party fusion in the early 1970s. The government forced political parties based on religious ideological affiliations to join a single entity, namely the United Development Party (PPP). Meanwhile, nationalist and Christian parties were merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The consolidation of these parties not only simplified the party system but also reflected the state's systematic efforts to subdue political pluralism in the name of constructed stability. The peak of repression against Islamic political expression occurred in the early 1980s with the implementation of the Pancasila single principle policy for all socio-political organizations. President Suharto explicitly stated that all socio-political forces in Indonesia must adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological principle. This policy ideologically cornered the PPP and PDI, which were forced to submit and adapt, even though many internal cadres objected.

In addition to suppressing political institutions, the New Order also implemented a policy of depoliticization in religious spaces. The Ministry of Religious Affairs was given the mandate to control religious activities to ensure that there was no connection between religious discourse and political agendas. Preachers were required to obtain official permits and were prohibited from raising potentially political themes in their sermons. This policy clearly demonstrated the state's efforts to narrowly define religion as an individual spiritual activity that was subject to the principles of national stability and economic development.

The Soeharto regime positioned itself as the protector of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and created a narrative that political stability was an absolute requirement for development. Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were used as hegemonic tools to justify restrictions on political diversity. Political Islam was positioned as a potential source of disintegration that must be controlled in order to achieve the state's version of social harmony. Therefore, all forms of Islamic political expression were restricted, monitored, and directed so as not to exceed the limits set by the state.

However, even though Indonesia does not formally adhere to a secular or theocratic system, ideological debates continue to take place in the intellectual and political spheres. In the 1970s, a heated discourse emerged regarding the relationship between Islam and the state, involving thinkers such as Nurcholish Madjid, H.M.

Rasyidi, and Endang Saifuddin Anshari. Nurcholish Madjid is known as the pioneer of modern Islamic thought in Indonesia, emphasizing the importance of renewal in understanding Islamic teachings, including in terms of the relationship between religion and politics. He popularized the idea of secularization not in the sense of removing religion, but as an effort to purify religious values from worldly claims to power. For Madjid, secularization was a way to make religion more down-to-earth and relevant in modern life, emphasizing the importance of freedom of thought, the spirit of ijтиhad, and openness to change. This view was opposed by HM. Rasyidi, who considered Madjid's idea of secularization to be overly reliant on human rationality. According to him, prioritizing reason as the main source of truth would shift the role of religion from the public and political spheres, limiting it to personal worship, and ultimately reducing the social role of religion in society.

The debate over secularism resurfaced in the late 1990s, particularly between Denny JA and Ahmad Sumargono. In his article in the Kompas newspaper, Denny voiced the importance of secularism for Indonesia in order to prevent the politicization of religion. He criticized the tendency to use religion for political purposes or to make politics a part of religion. According to him, such practices could trigger conflict in a country with a highly diverse society such as Indonesia. Therefore, he considered that the separation of religion from state affairs was an important step in maintaining national harmony. However, Ahmad Sumargono rejected this idea. He argued that secularism, which may be suitable in Western countries, is not relevant for a Muslim-majority country like Indonesia. He criticized that in reality, the state cannot be completely neutral towards religion, as it must still be involved in matters such as religious education, the construction of places of worship, the regulation of halal food, the management of zakat, and so on. According to him, efforts to separate religion from the state are merely an illusion. He also believes that accusations of the politicization of religion are often relative and subjective, and can be used as a tool by certain groups to reject the application of Islamic values in state affairs.

The process of political secularization in Indonesia runs from top to bottom. This means that the separation between religion, in this case Islam, and politics, is carried out unilaterally by the government or those in power, not by the will of the people. On the other hand, there has also been a change in the way politics is viewed. Whereas in

the past the approach was more symbolic or formal, it is now beginning to be directed towards more substantial matters, as stated by several Islamic thinkers. Both in terms of power and ideology, both sides are trying to push for religion to become more of a personal matter, while nationalism is made the mainstay of state life. As a result, the role of Islam has slowly been shifted and placed under the dominance of the spirit of nationalism. However, this top-down approach to secularization has not been strong enough. In fact, in order to be successful, there must be support from the people. Unfortunately, this support does not exist. Political secularization in Indonesia has ultimately become the agenda of the elite alone. Because it has not been widely welcomed by the people, this idea has become fragile and does not have strong roots.

In fact, efforts to separate Islam from politics often faced resistance from Muslims themselves. For them, Islam is not just a matter of personal worship, but has become part of all aspects of life, including politics. The clearest example of this was seen in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The victory of the Anies-Sandi pair over Ahok-Djarot was seen as a reflection of political choices based on religious values. Many Jakarta residents, as well as Muslims outside Jakarta, showed their support for Muslim candidates as a form of " " (religious loyalty) to the teachings of Islam.

The reaction of Muslims to Ahok's alleged blasphemy also shows the same thing. They did not remain silent when the Qur'an was considered to have been insulted. Various efforts were made, ranging from reporting to the authorities, collecting demands, to peaceful actions. In this process, Muslims felt confronted by state apparatus, particularly the police, who appeared to be biased and even often committed unfair acts, such as criminalizing Muslim clerics and leaders. But even so, the spirit of the people to defend their religion remained strong. They continued to insist that perpetrators of blasphemy be prosecuted and receive appropriate punishment.

CONCLUSION

Politics in the early days of independence experienced several disputes and arguments due to debates over the formation of the foundations of the state. Islamic groups wanted all Indonesians to adhere to one religion, namely Islam, but secular groups wanted a unitary republic with religion not interfering in state or political affairs. Thus, after the BPUPKI session that produced the Jakarta Charter, many Indonesians,

especially in the eastern region, opposed the first principle, which reads "Belief in God, with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents." This sparked protests from the Indonesian people because Indonesia is a diverse country in terms of ethnicity, race, culture, language, and religion. There were many protests and criticisms from the Indonesian people, especially in the eastern region, because the majority of Christians and Catholics felt that they were experiencing religious discrimination. They feared that this phrase would lead to injustice, discrimination, and the domination of the majority over the minority. While Islamic groups see Islam as a way of life (syumuliyah) that must be applied in the state system, secular (nationalist) groups see religion as a personal matter. Furthermore, on the initiative of Soekarno and Moh. Hatta to maintain national unity, this revision was carried out quickly and secretly. This was eventually changed to "Belief in One God" at the next session.

The end of the political conflict between Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists was enforced during the New Order era by encouraging political parties with religious ideologies to unite into a single entity, namely the United Development Party (PPP). On the other hand, nationalist and Christian parties were merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

The unification of these parties not only simplified the party system, but also reflected the state's efforts to control political pluralism in order to achieve the desired stability. The peak of repressive actions against Islamic political expression occurred in the early 1980s with the enactment of the Pancasila single principle policy for all socio-political organizations. President Suharto explicitly required all socio-political forces in Indonesia to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis. Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were used as tools of domination to justify restrictions on political diversity. Political Islam was seen as a threat to unity that needed to be controlled in order to achieve the version of social harmony desired by the state. Therefore, all forms of Islamic political expression were restricted, monitored, and directed so as not to exceed the limits set by the state.

The debate over the position of Islamic ideology in Indonesia's national and political life continues to this day, albeit in a different form and with varying intensity compared to the early days of independence. The conflict between groups that want to

enforce the application of Islamic values more explicitly in the political sphere and groups that support the principles of secularism and the separation of religion from politics remains a central issue in Indonesia's political dynamics. However, this debate is no longer solely about determining the basis of the state, but rather about how to balance religious values with pluralism and democracy, which are characteristic of the Indonesian nation.

The resolution of this debate ultimately led to the recognition and acceptance of the principles of Pancasila as the basis of the state, capable of accommodating religious and belief diversity, including Islam, without making any one religion the sole basis of the state. Pancasila facilitates dialogue and compromise between religious aspirations and the demands of a pluralistic modern state, so that the state continues to uphold religious values while maintaining the integrity and unity of the nation.

Thus, the solution found is not the domination of a particular ideology, but rather a national agreement that places religion as a source of morals and ethics, while managing state affairs rationally and inclusively. This is reflected in Indonesia's democratic practices, which provide space for religious freedom while upholding the principles of justice and equality for all citizens. Contemporary debates show that although challenges to the relationship between religion and the state remain, the best solution is to maintain a balance between religious identity and inclusive national values.

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