

DI/TII Movement 1949–1962: Conflict of Islamic Ideology and Nationalism in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This study discusses the DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) movement in 1949-1962 as one of modern Indonesian history's most significant ideological conflicts. The primary focus includes (1) The origins of DI/TII led by SM Kartosoewirjo in the period 1949-1962, (2) Chronology of the Rebellion in each region including West Java, Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, (3) Factors in the occurrence of the DI/TII incident, (4) Ideology and DI/TII Movement, (5) Doctrine and goals of DI/TII including the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia/NII, (6) Relations with other Islamic movements, (7) Struggle strategies, (8) Impact and suppression of the DI/TII rebellion in Indonesia, (9) Government efforts to suppress DI/TII, and (10) The role of General AH Nasution. This study aims to examine the DI/TII rebellion as an Islamic political phenomenon, examining the interaction of ideology, strategy, figures, policies, and their impacts in Indonesia. The research method used in the study is a qualitative historical and political approach and an analytical descriptive approach that examines historical documents such as archives, academic literature, and interview results. The study results show that the DI/TII rebellion was not only driven by religious factors but was also a manifestation of the dynamics of post-independence Indonesian politics, society, and economy. This study highlights the importance of the interaction between ideological factors, movement strategies, the role of figures, and government policies in shaping the characteristics and long-term impacts of Islamic political movements in Indonesia.

Keywords: DI/TII, SM Kartosoewirjo, Movement, Rebellion.

INTRODUCTION

The DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) rebellion on August 7, 1949, was a response to the Renville agreement, which was very detrimental to Indonesia. After the First Dutch Military Aggression, several community groups considered this agreement a formality to strengthen the Dutch position in Indonesia. The Renville

Agreement made Indonesia's territory increasingly narrow, covering Central Java, Sumatra, and Yogyakarta, while the Netherlands obtained strategic areas such as East Java and West Java (Harianto, 2022). After the Renville agreement, the Indonesian government implemented a reorganization and rationalization (RERA) policy to shorten the TNI structure and facilitate the management system (Fatimah & Indriyanto, 2020). However, the Indonesian government did not expect this policy to cause a wave of protests from former soldiers and local fighters who felt betrayed by their nation's system.

At the same time, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo and Raden Oni discussed carrying out resistance by establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia or NII. People who were disappointed with the government began to join and support this resistance so that in a short time, the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) had a significant and widespread army. Initially, this resistance was only in West Java; over time, the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement spread to Aceh, led by Daud Beureuh, then continued to South Sulawesi, commanded by Kahar Muzakkar, to Central Java, led by Amir Fatah (Fikriansyah et al., 2021). The Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement was motivated by the results of the Renville agreement and because the Indonesian government was considered less firm in making decisions regarding the Dutch stance.

As the leader of the resistance and the grand imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), Kartosoewirjo ordered the leaders of each region to focus on gathering as many troops as possible, utilizing border areas as resistance actions and collecting money from local communities to fund the resistance movement. The Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) and the Indonesian National Army (TNI) were involved in several armed conflicts in various regions. To overcome this, the government took a peaceful approach by distributing leaflets with information on surrender to remote villages, hoping that the DI/TII troops would surrender peacefully (Andriliani & Syahuri, 2025). However, this did not show good results, so the government was forced to take other measures by forming various DI/TII suppression movements by the Indonesian National Army (TNI).

Others focused on the Islamic ideology in the DI/TII rebellion. The Quran can be used as a basis for legitimizing the actions and development of an ideology because the Quran is considered a sacred text containing direct teachings from God. Socio-political

issues that occurred from 1949 to the 1960s became one of the triggers for the rebellion, for example, discrimination against Islamic groups, conflicts between clerics and elite pro-nationalist figures, and the dissolution of the Aceh province. In other case studies, it was also stated that DI/TII carried out the rebellion because of religious motivation and deep dissatisfaction with the political-economic system, which was considered unfair, and did not side with the ordinary people.

Although many studies have discussed the ideological, social, and political aspects of the DI/TII rebellion, the author wants to explore further the understanding of how the gap in the interaction between Islamic ideology, local power dynamics, and government responses in forming resistance patterns in various regions. Studies and comparative studies on the factors that strengthen or weaken the DI/TII movement are still limited; sometimes, the explanation from one source to another is always the same and rarely provides an understanding from a different historical perspective.

This study further analyzed the DI/TII rebellion as a phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia. By understanding the background, objectives, and dynamics of socio-political and religious issues underlying it, we can present the impacts of the DI/TII rebellion. This study also attempts to fill the gaps that have been explained previously by examining the interaction between ideology, strategy, the role of figures, and government policies in shaping the characteristics of the DI/TII movement in various regions, as well as its implications for the development of Islamic politics in Indonesia.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This study uses an analytical framework that combines the political history and sociology of religion approaches to understand the DI/TII rebellion as a phenomenon of Islamic politics in Indonesia. The analysis focuses on a case study of the ideological dimension, namely the role of Islamic ideology and the concept of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) initiated by Kartosoewirjo as the basis for the DI/TII movement. Furthermore, there is also a study of socio-economic dissatisfaction, discrimination against Islamic groups, and conflicts between the government and local religious figures. Finally, there is an analysis of the influence of geographical conditions that support guerrilla tactics, the role of weapons distribution, and the support of military personnel in maintaining the movement. With this analytical framework, it will be

easier for readers to understand the relationship between ideological, geographical, and social factors that made the DI/TII rebellion movement survive for quite a long time. The research method used in this study is a qualitative historical and political approach and an analytical descriptive approach that examines historical documents such as archives, academic literature, and interview results. Primary and secondary sources were also used in this study. Our chosen approach can help in the chronological reconstruction stage and in-depth analysis of the DI/TII rebellion movement. In this study, the scope of the discussion of the DI/TII rebellion was taken between 1949 and the 1960s, with a case study in the West Java region as the beginning of the movement, as well as in other areas such as Aceh, South Sulawesi, and Central Java.

DISCUSSION

1. The origins of DI/TII, which Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo led

Initially, the Darul Islam (DI) movement was a social movement led by SM Kartosoewirjo; this was a response to the Dutch colonialism that had not been completed after independence and was also a protest against West Java, which was only part of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) (Supyan, 2016). RIS resulted from the Linggarjati and Renville agreements from the Round Table Conference between the Indonesian and Dutch governments. The purpose of this movement was to want Indonesia to be fully sovereign over the independence that had been proclaimed. Slowly but surely, from a powerful spirit and desire, Kartosoewirjo founded the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) based on Islamic law. According to him, this was a middle way from the ideological deadlock between the Netherlands and Indonesia, which at that time were busy determining the direction and foundation of the state. Kartosoewirjo rejected Pancasila as the basis of the state because it did not fully reflect Islamic principles and preferred to establish a theocratic state based on Islamic law (Hikmawati, 2024).

The proclamation of the establishment of the NII was carried out on August 7, 1949, in Cisampah Village, West Java. It became the forerunner of the armed movement known as Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII). Kartosoewirjo formed his own military and government structure, mobilized his followers to

fight for the establishment of an Islamic state, and viewed the government of the Republic of Indonesia as an entity that had deviated from Islamic values. This movement then spread to various regions in Indonesia, such as Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, with local figures also taking up arms in the same spirit, although not always under Kartosoewirjo's direct command (Ruhana, 2011).

However, over time, the DI/TII movement began to lose support because the violent methods used often caused suffering to civilians. The government of the Republic of Indonesia responded by launching various military operations, local diplomacy, and deradicalization programs to quell the resistance. Finally, Kartosoewirjo was captured in Operation Baratayudha in 1962 on Mount Geber, West Java. He was then sentenced to Death by the government and executed in September 1962. Since then, DI/TII activities have faded significantly, although the ideology instilled by Kartosoewirjo remains an inspiration for several radical groups in the following periods (Soetama, 2016).

2. Chronology of the Rebellion

a) West Java

In 1949, in West Java, a rebellion movement emerged led by Kartosoewirjo, who was dissatisfied with the results of the Renville negotiations. The rebellion demanded the formation of an Islamic State, which wanted Indonesia to become a completely Islamic state. The rebellion movement was known as the Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII). Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia on August 7, 1949, in Tasikmalaya, West Java, and claimed himself as the state imam. He also formed a series of new government systems and concepts. This rebellion was the Indonesian nation's first conflict after independence (Alia, 2021).

The DI/TII rebellion in West Java continued to grow after the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia by Kartosoewirjo. This movement attracted the sympathy of some people who were disappointed with the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the presence of the Dutch military in the West Java region after the Renville negotiations. Kartosoewirjo took

advantage of this situation to expand his influence by spreading radical Islamic ideology and mobilizing the masses and armed militias. Over time, DI/TII troops began to carry out various acts of violence, such as attacks on TNI posts, killing government officials, and controlling areas in the interior of West Java. The Indonesian government attempted to overcome this movement by launching various military operations. One of the significant operations was carried out in the 1950s, including Operation Pagar Betis and Operation Baratayudha, which aimed to cut off logistics routes and isolate DI/TII guerrillas. This rebellion lasted a pretty long time and became a serious threat to national stability. After years of pursuit, Kartosoewirjo was finally captured by the TNI in June 1962 at Mount Geber, Majalengka. He was then sentenced to Death and executed in September 1962. With the capture of Kartosoewirjo, the DI/TII rebellion in West Java gradually weakened and was finally declared over.

b) Central Java

The DI/TII movement in South Brebes, Central Java, occurred between 1948 and 1957 and was triggered by various factors. One is the post-independence military reorganization that led to the elimination of paramilitary groups, ideological conflicts between Islam, federalism, and communism, and government policies considered unfair and more beneficial to specific groups. Religious fanaticism and community obedience to religious figures helped strengthen the base of this movement, especially in areas that geographically supported guerrilla activities (Arief, 2006). The unity of DI/TII in this region began with the merger of various elements, such as Battalion V led by Amir Fatah, Hizbullah Brebes, and Mujahidin Indonesia (MI) from Pekalongan, which was later strengthened by the entry of elements of the Islamic People's Force (AUI) and former Battalion 426. Their activities included limited military operations, the spread of ideology, and acts of violence against government officials and the community. In South Brebes, the DI/TII Kastolani group also emerged, dominated by adventurers and criminals, whose activities increasingly deviated from the ideals of Islamic struggle and were more directed towards criminal acts such

as looting, extortion, and murder. This caused public support to decline drastically because they felt threatened and disadvantaged. This condition weakened the existence of DI/TII, which was finally increasingly pressured by various military operations carried out intensively by the TNI. As the support base decreased and military pressure increased, the DI/TII movement in South Brebes declined until it was finally completely crushed towards the end of the 1950s.

c) Aceh

The DI/TII rebellion certainly had specific causes, so the DI/TII rebellion could emerge in Aceh, which Tgk pioneered. Muhammad Daud Beureu-eh. One of them was the dissatisfaction of the Acehnese people towards the central government, according to one of the historical actors, namely Tgk. M. Nur El Ibrahimy, the incident that became a national problem, was closely related to the center's tendency (Jakarta), which was considered hypocritical and disappointed the ulama figures in Aceh. The rebellion resulted in the holding of the Indonesian Ulama Congress, which took place in Medan in April 1953, where Tgk. Muhammad Daud Beureu-eh held the leadership as general chairman. In that forum, a decision was agreed to fight for the Republic of Indonesia to become the Islamic State of Indonesia through general elections. The peak of tension occurred on September 21, 1953, when Tgk. Daud Beureu-eh, who previously served as the Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo as well as the first Governor of Aceh, took up arms against the central government and proclaimed Aceh as part of the Islamic State of Indonesia under the leadership of Kartosoewirjo. This incident is known as the Daud Beureu-eh Rebellion, which the Acehnese people call bloody. This movement received widespread sympathy among the Acehnese people, who felt betrayed by the revocation of Aceh's status as a special region and its incorporation into the Province of North Sumatra. Although it had controlled several areas, the power of DI/TII in Aceh began to weaken as popular support declined due to the prolonged conflict and the central government's military and political approach strategies. At its peak, in 1962, Tgk. Daud Beureu-eh surrendered

to the government after a long negotiation process and approaching religious figures, marking the end of Aceh's DI/TII rebellion (Djamas, 2013).

d) South Sulawesi

One of the rebellions that will always be remembered in the history of South Sulawesi is the DI/TII rebellion led by Abdul Kahar Muzakkar. This rebellion was motivated by his disappointment with the central government's policies, especially regarding the neglect of the role of the paramilitary troops in the struggle for independence (Ridha, 2018). Moreover, before joining DI/TII, Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, who at that time served as Commander of the Seberang Group Command (KGS) with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, asked Saleh Syahban to gather the paramilitary troops of South Sulawesi into the South Sulawesi Guerrilla Unit (KGSS). This unit was formed in August 1949 in Maros and consisted of 10 battalions, which were planned to be the forerunner of the Hasanuddin Division with Kahar Muzakkar as its commander. However, when these hopes did not materialize, and the central government did not fulfill its promise, Kahar Muzakkar chose to separate himself from the official military structure and in 1952 declared that he had joined the Darul Islam movement led by Kartosoewirjo. Since then, he proclaimed South Sulawesi as part of the Islamic State of Indonesia and led the guerrillas for approximately 15 years. The DI/TII movement in South Sulawesi carried out various attacks on government officials and became a serious threat to regional stability. The central government responded with intensive military operations. The end of this rebellion occurred on February 3, 1965, when Kahar Muzakkar was killed in an ambush by the TNI in a forest near Lasusua, North Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi, which also marked the collapse of the DI/TII movement in South Sulawesi (Gonggong, 2004).

e) South Kalimantan

The DI/TII rebellion in South Kalimantan was part of a series of Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia movements that spread to various regions in Indonesia. This movement began to appear in the early 1950s, led by Ibnu

Hadjar, a former commander of the Indonesian Republic Army (TRI) who was disappointed with the central government's policies, especially regarding the reorganization of the military that did not accommodate local laskar fighters. After feeling marginalized in the official military structure, Ibnu Hadjar formed an armed organization known as the Unity of the Oppressed People (KRyT), which later merged ideologically with the Darul Islam movement under the leadership of Kartosoewirjo. In 1954, Ibnu Hadjar officially declared South Kalimantan as part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. This movement carried out sabotage, attacks on government officials, and control of inland areas, especially in the Hulu Sungai area. However, the DI/TII movement in South Kalimantan did not gain widespread support from the community because many acts of violence harmed civilians. The central government responded with military operations and a persuasive approach to its followers. Finally, in 1963, Ibnu Hadjar surrendered, and the DI/TII movement in South Kalimantan was officially over. This rebellion reflected the tension between the regions and the center after independence and how local disappointments could develop into armed separatist movements when not appropriately managed politically and militarily (Djamas, 2013).

3. Causative Factor

From the chronologies of the DI/TII rebellion in various regions of Indonesia, such as West Java, Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, it can be concluded that several main factors caused the emergence of this movement. One of the most prominent factors was dissatisfaction with the central government, especially regarding post-independence political and military policies that were considered to have ignored the contributions of local groups, such as the Laskar and regional fighter figures (Arief, 2006). The military reorganization that did not accommodate former people's fighters and the elimination of the special status of several regions, such as Aceh, triggered disappointment and betrayal. In addition, ideological factors and religion also played a significant role, namely the desire to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, which was considered more in line with the values of Sharia and the

aspirations of the ulama figures at that time. Figures such as Kartosoewirjo, Daud Beureu-eh, and Kahar Muzakkar felt that the government system of the Republic of Indonesia did not sufficiently represent the Islamic values they fought for. The ideological conflict between Islamic, nationalist, and communist groups, as well as the unstable socio-political situation, also increased the space for the development of this separatist movement. Initial support from local communities who felt close to religious figures slowly faded as violence and extreme actions by rebel groups spread. Finally, disappointment with the center, religious motives, and political exclusion became the leading causes of the emergence and spread of the DI/TII movement in various regions (Lutfiana, 2017).

4. Ideology and Movement of DI/TII

The Darul Islam Movement/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) adhered to a philosophy of radical Islamism that opposed the democratic and secular government of the Republic of Indonesia after independence. The core of this ideology was the belief that Islamic law (kaffah) was the only valid law and must be applied in national life. SM Kartosoewirjo, the central figure of this movement, considered a country that did not follow Allah's law to be an infidel state and should not be respected. As a result, the goal of DI/TII was to create the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) as a theocratic government led by an Imam who had the highest authority in the fields of religion and politics. According to this perspective, God has sovereignty, not the people, as in a democratic system, and man-made laws, such as the 1945 Constitution, are considered invalid and must be rejected. DI/TII's rejection of the idea of a nation-state and secular nationalism led them to spread propaganda that the government of the Republic of Indonesia was a new form of colonialism that was contrary to Islam. In addition, they opposed elections, political parties, and parliament, which they considered to be tools of Western liberalism that would only distance people from the actual teachings of Islam. In contrast, DI/TII promoted a pure Islamic system, free from domestic and international cultural influences, and encouraged armed jihad as a means of implementing Islamic law.

This ideology is not only political but also religious, with jihad considered the central worship to overthrow a government that does not adhere to Islam. DI/TII

created its state structure, including the military (TII), cabinet, and internal government system. This shows that they are not just carrying out armed rebellion but building a counter-government based on Islamic principles. DI/TII's ideology makes it one of contemporary Indonesian history's most important radical Islamic movements. In addition, radical Islamic figures such as Ibn Taimiyah and Sayyid Quthb influenced DI/TII's ideology. The theory that modern society lives in a state of ignorance is used as a basis for judging Muslim countries that do not follow Sharia (Asriel & Pores, 2022). These concepts later became the inspiration for other radical Islamic movements, such as Komando Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah, which in many ways are ideological and biological continuations of DI/TII. Thus, the DI/TII ideology is not only the foundation for past separatist movements but also an ideological legacy for the current generation of radicals, including those who are members of transnational networks such as ISIS.

5. The doctrine and goals of DI/TII (the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia/NII)

Based on the ideology of radical Islamism, Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) has its central doctrine and goal. This ideology places Islamic law as the only legal basis for national life. The establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), declared by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo on August 7, 1949, was the culmination of the belief that the government of the Republic of Indonesia based on artificial law is a form of infidelity that must be rejected and fought. Kartosoewirjo's doctrine is that sovereignty is entirely in the hands of Allah (*al-hakimiyyah lillah*), unlike in a democratic system. As a result, there is only a system of government that recognizes the Qur'an and Sunnah as the only sources of law that God can trust and recognize.

The Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) was intended to be an Islamic theocracy led by an Imam, not a president or head of state, by the idea of a modern republic. Its goal was to implement Allah's law (*kaffah*). In addition to religious or spiritual reasons, DI/TII had a political goal, namely, to overthrow the legitimate government of the Republic of Indonesia and replace it with an Islamic government. Jihad was interpreted as worship and a political and military tool to establish NII (Fikriansyah et al., 2022). Kartosoewirjo considered the government

of the Republic of Indonesia as thaghut (a cruel government that is not based on Sharia), which means it must be fought. In addition, DI/TII encouraged Muslims to migrate, declare allegiance to their Islamic leaders, and change their loyalty from the Republic of Indonesia to the NII region. In the NII proclamation, the rejection of artificial law was clearly stated and translated into the formation of ministries, an Islamic judicial system, and an Islamic army (TII), which functioned as defense and expanded state power. Therefore, the doctrine and goals of DI/TII not only emphasize the normative enforcement of Sharia but also seek to build a rival state to realize their ideology and form an ideal Islamic society.

6. Relations with Other Islamic Movements

The relationship between Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) and other Islamic movements in Indonesia shows a complex and sometimes controversial dynamic. Indeed, DI/TII and other Islamic movements, such as Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, have common ground in terms of the spirit of Islamism and rejection of secularism. While DI/TII firmly rejected the legitimacy of the Republic and chose the path of armed rebellion to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), these movements tended to take the path of constitutional politics and fight for the interests of Muslims in the context of the Republic of Indonesia. DI/TII became an exclusive movement and was often at odds or hostile to moderate Islamic groups because they rejected democracy, nationalism, and positive law. Due to ideological disagreements, DI/TII did not have structural or formal relations with other major Islamic organizations. They even considered people who did not support the struggle to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) as part of the modern jahiliyyah system that needed to be fought. This extreme view triggered the practice of takfir, namely declaring fellow Muslims as infidels. Thus, violence was justified against anyone who was considered to be against their beliefs, including community leaders, religious leaders, and even ordinary people loyal to the Republic of Indonesia. DI/TII's relationship with other Islamic groups was often marked by conflict rather than collaboration. However, it is interesting that DI/TII had no formal relationship with a well-known Islamic organization, and its ideological influence remained strong among the next generation of radicals.

Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and the founders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are some of the important figures in the modern jihad movement in Indonesia who are known to have ties or are close to the DI/TII network and thinking. This legacy is ideological but also biological and structural because many are direct students or children of NII exponents from the Kartosoewirjo era. The principles of DI/TII's struggle, such as rejecting democracy, the Islamic caliphate, armed jihad, and takfir, were re-adopted by new groups at the global and transnational level, such as the Al-Qaeda and ISIS networks. Therefore, DI/TII's relationship with other Islamic movements shows the polarization among Indonesian Muslims regarding the peaceful and democratic choice versus the radical and violent choice. Although DI/TII failed to build a strategic alliance with the most prominent Islamic organizations, they succeeded in becoming pioneers of the radical movement. Their ideology has been inherited and changed by the next generation of radicals. DI/TII continues to grow, especially among teenagers more easily exposed to extreme ideologies through the internet and social media. This makes it not only a historical record but also a foundation for the discourse and practice of radical Islam in Indonesia today.

7. Struggle Strategy

To establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) struggle strategy was organized through three main approaches: military, political, and propaganda. All three worked together to achieve the main goal, namely to overthrow the government of the Republic of Indonesia and replace it with a theocratic Islamic government based on Sharia. Militarily, DI/TII formed the Indonesian Islamic Army as an official armed force that carried out guerrilla operations against the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and state apparatus. TII built strength in areas such as West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and Kalimantan by utilizing the forest and mountain climate to defend and attack. Its war strategy was similar to guerrilla warfare, using tactics such as ambushes and sabotage and taking remote villages as logistics and recruitment locations. The DI/TII military was not only tasked with combat but also functioned as an instrument of social control and ideological guard in the areas they claimed as NII's territory. In addition, they often attacked parties who were

considered to oppose or did not support their goals, including fellow Muslims, whom they considered "infidels."

Regarding politics, DI/TII formed a rival government structure simultaneously, although they rejected the democratic political system and the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Kartosoewirjo founded NII with a state structure, a cabinet, ministries, and an Imam as head of state. They carried out administrative, legal, and economic functions by Islamic principles. The formation of this shadow state aimed to give its supporters internal political legitimacy and show that NII was a legal alternative to the Republic's government. In addition, this political approach reflected an effort to build an ideological and social foundation that supported a movement that would last in the long term, such as the implementation of Sharia law in controlled areas.

On the other hand, in the field of propaganda, DI/TII used a systematic ideological approach to raise awareness among Muslims of the importance of building an Islamic state. They spread the story that because the Republic of Indonesia did not use the Qur'an and Sunnah as its legal basis, people should oppose it. Ideology was spread primarily through da'wah through lectures or print media, leaflets, and internal circulars. This propaganda strategy emphasized jihad as an act of worship and collective obligation, as well as the importance of migration from the Republic to the NII as a form of obedience to Allah and its leaders (Fatimah & Indriyanto, 2020). In addition, DI/TII utilized networks of local religious figures and Islamic boarding schools to strengthen the mass base and develop ideological cadres loyal to the struggle. DI/TII combined these three strategies to create a radical Islamic movement that relied on the power of arms, ideological legitimacy, and an alternative political system. In Indonesia, the next generation of radical movements followed this struggle model.

8. The Impact of the DI/TII Rebellion in Indonesia

a) Social Impact

The Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) movement that took place from the late 1940s to the early 1960s had a significant social impact on communities in various regions, especially West Java, South Sulawesi, and other areas that were the bases of this movement. Lidyani's (2023) research shows that the DI/TII rebellion caused food shortages due to looting by rebel troops, which directly impacted the hardships of life for the

people of Rajasthan village, Brebes. In addition, acts of violence such as murder, kidnapping, and burning of houses caused fear and insecurity among residents (Lidyani, 2023). In the Mamuju area, West Sulawesi, DI/TII activities caused social chaos in the form of massive population migration, disruption of education because schools were closed or teachers were targeted for kidnapping, and the forced implementation of Islamic law which caused social tension (Fikram, 2022). In Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi, the blockade and activities of DI/TII caused regional isolation, food shortages, and socio-cultural disruptions such as the disruption of traditional ceremonies and instability of village government (Arifin, 2023).

b) Political Impact

Politically, the DI/TII rebellion seriously threatened national stability and the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). This movement rejected Pancasila as the basis of the state and demanded establishing an independent Islamic state, thus giving rise to deep ideological conflict (Sari, 2024). DI/TII triggered tensions between the central and regional governments, mainly because of the presence of sympathizers at the local level who strengthened this separatist movement. The DI/TII rebellion forced the central government to declare an emergency in several regions and strengthen the military's role in national politics. This conflict also impacted Indonesia's diplomatic relations with other countries due to security issues and domestic political stability (Santoso, 2023).

c) Economic Impact

The economic impact of the DI/TII rebellion was very pronounced in areas that became conflict zones. Rahman (2023) explained that damage to infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and public facilities, hampered economic activity and the distribution of goods. Agricultural production and trade declined drastically, causing shortages of necessities and inflation. The government had to divert the development budget to finance military operations and infrastructure reconstruction so that national economic development slowed down (Sari, 2024). Political and security instability

also reduced investment interest, worsening the economic conditions of the affected areas (Santoso, 2023).

9. Government Efforts to Suppress the DI/TII Rebellion

a) Operation Fence of Legs

Operation Pagar Betis was a military strategy the Indonesian National Army (TNI) implemented to crush the DI/TII rebellion, especially in West Java. Nasution (2025) explained that this operation involved a tight siege of the rebel base by forming a defense line involving (Hikmawati et al., 2024) (Ruhana, 2011) TNI troops and local communities as a fence. This strategy aimed to cut off DI/TII's logistics and communication lines so that their movement room was limited. This practical approach led to the arrest of DI/TII leader SM Kartosoewirjo on June 4, 1962 (Nasution, 2025).

b) Operation Bharatayudha

Operation Bharatayudha was a major military operation in 1962 to crush the DI/TII rebellion in West Java. This operation used coordinated siege and attack tactics involving thousands of TNI personnel, supported by intelligence and local community cooperation (Nasution, 2025). The success of this operation was marked by the destruction of the rebel base and the capture of the prominent leaders of DI/TII, which was the turning point in ending the rebellion.

c) Diplomatic Efforts

In addition to military operations, the government also made diplomatic efforts to defuse the DI/TII conflict. Halim (2024) explains that the government sent national figures like Dr. J. Leimena to negotiate with rebel leaders, offering amnesty and reintegration into the Republic of Indonesia. However, these diplomatic efforts often encountered obstacles due to the hardline stance of DI/TII leaders who rejected integration and continued to demand the establishment of a separate Islamic state.

10. The Role of General AH Nasution in the Suppression of DI/TI

General Abdul Haris Nasution was the most influential military figure in suppressing Indonesia's DI/TII rebellion. As the Chief of Staff of the Army

(KASAD), Nasution acted as a field commander, effective strategist, and policy designer. The rebellion lasted for more than a decade.

a) The Concept of Total People's Defense

One of Nasution's most significant contributions was developing the Total People's Defense concept, which emphasized the importance of involving all levels of society in defending the country. This concept did not only rely on formal military power but also integrated the power of civilians as part of the national defense system. In the DI/TII rebellion context, this concept was applied by involving local communities in surveillance, securing areas, and providing intelligence information to TNI troops (Nasution, 2025). The application of this concept succeeded in narrowing the DI/TII rebels' room for maneuver because they were facing military troops and communities who actively rejected the rebels' presence and assisted the TNI in suppression operations. This strengthened the central government's position and accelerated the process of paralyzing the DI/TII movement.

b) Military Strategy and Operational Coordination

Nasution directly led primary military operations such as Operation Pagar Betis and Operation Bharatayudha, which became important milestones in suppressing DI/TII. In Operation Pagar Betis, Nasution instructed the formation of a tight defense line around the rebel bases, isolating them from logistical sources and support from the wider community (Nasution, 2025). In addition, Nasution optimized military intelligence by building a strong intelligence network in conflict areas. This allowed the TNI to obtain accurate information on the movements and strengths of DI/TII so that military operations could be carried out precisely and efficiently (Prasetyo, 2024). Nasution also emphasized the principle of "quick and coordinated attacks" to minimize civilian losses and systematically destroy the rebel power bases. He led coordination between TNI units from various regions, including infantry, cavalry, and special forces, so operations ran synergistically and effectively.

c) Humanist and Political Approach

In addition to military power, Nasution also realized the importance of a political and humanist approach to crushing the rebellion. He supported the central government's policy of opening up space for dialogue and amnesty for DI/TII members who were willing to surrender and return to the Republic of Indonesia. This approach aimed to reduce resistance and accelerate the restoration of socio-political stability in conflict areas (Nasution, 2025). Nasution also directed social and economic rehabilitation efforts in post-conflict areas by involving local governments and community leaders to rebuild trust and strengthen national unity.

d) Leadership Influence and Legacy

Nasution's leadership in crushing DI/TII not only succeeded in ending the rebellion that threatened the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia but also formed a new paradigm in Indonesia's national defense strategy. The concept of total people's defense developed by Nasution became the basis for a national defense system that integrated military and civilian forces. In addition, Nasution's success in managing military operations while prioritizing a humanist approach demonstrated the maturity of military leadership that relied not only on the power of weapons but also on diplomacy and reconciliation. This is an important example for Indonesia's military generation and policymakers (Prasetyo, 2024).

CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion of the research results above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) rebellion was one of the most significant Islamic political phenomena in post-independence Indonesian history. SM Kartosoewirjo pioneered this movement as a reaction to disappointment with the results of the Renville agreement, government policies that were considered discriminatory, and dissatisfaction with the national political and economic system that was considered unfair to Islamic groups and the ordinary people.

2. The DI/TII rebellion began in West Java and spread to several other areas, such as Aceh, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. This movement was driven by the desire to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) based on Islamic law as an alternative to the Pancasila state philosophy, which was considered not to represent Islamic principles fully.
3. This study highlights several factors that strengthened the DI/TII Movement, including:
 - a) Socio-economic dissatisfaction and discrimination against Islamic groups.
 - b) Ideological conflict between Islamic groups
 - c) Public support for the government is disappointing
 - d) Geographical conditions that support guerrilla tactics
 - e) The role of local figures and effective arms distribution
4. However, over time, this movement began to lose public support due to the frequent acts of violence against civilians and the increasingly distant activities of certain groups from the ideals of Islamic struggle. The government of the Republic of Indonesia responded with military operations, diplomacy, and deradicalization programs that finally succeeded in gradually crushing this rebellion in various regions, culminating in the capture and execution of Kartosoewirjo in 1962.
5. The impact of the DI/TII rebellion was vast, ranging from political and security instability to civilian suffering and changes in government policy regarding religious-based political movements in the following period. Although this rebellion ended physically, the ideology and spirit of struggle instilled by Kartosoewirjo remained an inspiration for several radical groups in Indonesia in the following periods.
6. Overall, this paper asserts that the DI/TII rebellion was not only a religious phenomenon but also a manifestation of political, social, and economic dynamics in Indonesia. This study also highlights the importance of understanding the interaction between ideological factors, movement strategies, the role of figures, and government policies in shaping the characteristics and long-term impacts of Islamic political movements in Indonesia.

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