



The Opposition of ‘Kelompok Islam 212’ (212 Islamic Group) to Joko Widodo's Government: Strengthening or Weakening Democracy?

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the opposition of the 212 Islamic Group to the government led by Joko Widodo. This study uses a qualitative approach by conducting in-depth interviews with nine informants from the 212 Islamic Group and the Moderate Islamic Group. In addition to conducting interviews, data was collected from written information from books, online media, and journals. This study concluded that the opposition carried out by ‘Kelompok Islam 212’ (‘the 212 Islamic Group’) against Joko Widodo has been carried out for a long time since the President of the Republic of Indonesia became Governor of DKI Jakarta. In that case, on the one hand, the opposition carried out by the group can strengthen democracy because there is a practice of checks and balances on power. Nevertheless, on the other hand, if this group wins, there is concern that the principle of democracy cannot be adequately implemented, because the group carries out exclusive practices politically and religiously.

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Introduction

The influence of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the 2024 presidential election (pilpres) is clearly visible, marked by the election of the Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Raka Bumi pair as president-vice president 2024-2029. Based on the KPU's calculations, the two pairs were able to win the contest in one round with. In accordance with the results of the vote count from the Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU) on the recapitulation of the results of the vote count and the acquisition of votes at the national level, Prabowo-Gibran were determined to have won 96,214,691 votes or around 58% of the total national votes. The pair won in 36 provinces (Vitorio Mantalean, 2024) (Tim detikNews, 2024).

Jokowi's support for the Prabowo-Gibran pair made the pair win the presidential election easily, making the competition in the presidential election less competitive than some people had expected. Before the President determined his support for Prabowo (Indonesian Minister of Defense), the presidential election was expected to take place in two rounds, meaning that no presidential candidate could get more than 50% of the vote in the first round. Some people believe that the competition to get votes in the presidential election will be balanced because Prabowo has two balanced rivals, namely Ganjar Pranowo and Anies Rasyid Bawesdan. Before Jokowi determined his support in the presidential election, based on survey results from several well-known institutions, the electability of the two figures was relatively balanced with Prabowo. But after Jokowi no longer positioned himself as a neutral party and agreed to Gibran Rakabumi, the mayor of Solo and the eldest son of the president, to be Prabowo's vice presidential candidate, the electability of the Indonesian Minister of Defense could no longer be balanced.

Normally, the president's involvement for a particular pair in the presidential election is better not to do. If the president is too biased, it is feared that political contestation will no longer be carried out by considering honesty. The head of state can use government facilities and economic resources for specific candidates. This makes the competition no longer balanced and makes specific candidates more advantageous to the state. The neutrality of the president that was expected to be realized in an effort to strengthen democratic practices in the presidential election turned out not to be because the president was not neutral. Jokowi's partisanship towards Prabowo was implicitly seen with the approval of Gibran Rakabumi, Prabowo's running mate and vice presidential candidate. In addition, the support of the Social Solidarity Party, a youth party led by Kaesang, Jokowi's second son, is another proof of Jokowi's partisanship towards Prabowo. Not only that, several volunteers who supported Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election, such as Projo, also gave their support to the Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabumi pair (BBC.com, 2023).

President Joko Widodo's deep involvement in the presidential election has received criticism from campus groups. Professors from several leading universities regret Jokowi's deep involvement in the presidential election, especially when he intervened with the Constitutional Court to allow people under 40 to become presidential/vice presidential candidates on the condition that the person concerned had previously been a regional head. This regulation enables Gibran, under 40 years old, to run in the 2024 presidential election.

Another disappointment from some people towards Jokowi is that the president from Solo is accused of using state instruments to win Prabowo-Gibran. Jokowi is charged with using civil and military bureaucracy in mobilizing the masses in an effort to win Prabowo-Gibran. In addition, the provision of social assistance by the president in various provinces in Indonesia ahead of the vote is considered an attempt by Jokowi to influence voters to support Prabowo-Gibran.(Puspitalova, 2024).

Intellectuals who questioned Jokowi's actions, considered not neutral in the 2024 presidential election, mainly were those who supported Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election. This means that these intellectuals initially did not position themselves as parties "opposing" the government led by Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The change in attitude of this group of intellectuals to become a party that was critical of the government occurred at the end of Jokowi's 2nd term of leadership because the president was considered to have damaged the democratic order. Disappointment with Jokowi's behavior, which was considered not to reflect a statesman's attitude, not only occurred among campus-educated people but also among some Islamic figures. One of them is Rizieq Shihab. The figure, who is called Habib Rizieq by his followers, is the founder of the Islamic Defender Front/Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and the central figure of the 212 Islamic Group. The 212 Islamic Group movement also received support from members and administrators of the Prosperous Justice Party. This party has been actively spreading Islamic teachings since the beginning of the reform era in 1998(Hasan, 2009)(Tanuwidjaja, 2010).

Method

This study is based on qualitative research. Therefore, the researcher is an instrument in this study, namely conducting direct data collection. In accordance with qualitative research, this study aims to understand the subjective meaning of the informant in depth. Because of qualitative research, this study can find intersubjective truth, namely the truth built from the interweaving of various factors, such as individual uniqueness, social context, and so on.

Data collection was carried out in two ways: textual research from books and in-depth interviews. Textual research, namely researching texts that come from online media journals and books containing ('Islamic Group 212') While in-depth interviews were conducted with several significant seven from the Islamic Group 212, namely Shobri Lubis, Bactiar Natsir, Ismail Yusanto, Abdullah Hemahua, Al Khaththath, Yusuf Martak, Slamet Maarif.

In addition, to complete the data collection, the researcher interviewed Said Aqil Siradj and Ulil Abshar Abdallah, as representatives of Moderate Islamic Figures. The researcher conducted interviews as interactions whose formation was assisted by the researcher and the subject. In the analysis, the interviewer and the subject were considered equal. In-depth interviews were conducted. The interviews were structured, namely an interview that used the same questions for each topic. The interview was believed to be complete when it reached a saturation point; the data collected was considered sufficient to answer the existing problems.

Results and Discussion

The Opposition of 'Kelompok Islam 212' ('212 Islamic Group')

Rizieq Shihab and other figures from the 212 Islamic Group' are the parties that supported Prabowo in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In the 2 (two elections), Prabowo was supported because he was considered a figure who was considered capable of competing with Jokowi. This means that support for Prabowo was more due to Shihab and the figures of The 212 Islamic Group not wanting Jokowi as head of state and government. Dislike of Joko Widodo caused Shihab not to give support to Prabowo in the 2024 presidential election, a figure he had supported totally in the previous two presidential elections.

Rizieq Shihab's political movement is increasingly evident in opposing Jokowi's political hegemony, as shown by him becoming one of the parties actively questioning the alleged bias of the KPU towards the Prabowo-Gibran pair. With several figures from retired police/TNI or civilians, he held a demonstration stating the KPU's non-neutrality in organizing the KPU. Rizieq Shihab's opposition to what Jokowi did in the 2024 presidential election is political behavior against the government since Joko Widodo became president in 2014. With The 212 Islamic Group, Shihab became a non-parliamentary group that never stopped criticizing the government's policies and actions of the government led by Jokowi. 'The 212 Islamic Group' is a group that is known to have emerged in public after they filed a lawsuit against Basuki Tjahya Gunawan for allegedly committing blasphemy in 2016 (Miichi, 2019). The group held demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of participants, including members of NU and Muhammadiyah, the two largest moderate Islamic organizations in Indonesia, on November 4 and 2 December 2016, to get Basuki Tjahya Gunawan - the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time - to be sentenced to prison (Mietzner, 2018) (Hadiz, 2019). Because of the large demonstrations at those two times, and continued by demonstrations in early 2017, the governor, known as Ahok, finally received a prison sentence.

The 2016 demonstration, later known as the 411 (4 November) and 212 (2 December) actions, was an accumulation of the disappointment of the Islamic Group towards Ahok. The Islamic Group, which, after the 2 December 2016 action, was known as 'the 212 Islamic Group', did not like Ahok since he replaced Jokowi as governor. Shobri Lubis, Chairman of Front Pembela Islam/FPI (the Islamic Defender Front), stated that the 212 Islamic Group rejected Ahok's existence as governor because the figure who came from the minority group was believed to be a representation of Jokowi's interests in the capital. In addition, as governor, Ahok's policies were considered detrimental to Islamic interests (interview on 26 March 2019 in Bogor, West Java).

The action of the 212 Islamic Group in holding a demonstration that brought hundreds of thousands of people from all over the country to Jakarta did not merely demoralize Ahok's leadership. However, the demonstrations were carried out continuously and brought in many people, which also aimed to discredit Jokowi's leadership. If the "411 and "212" actions involving many Islamic figures had an impact on Ahok, it is believed that it would also cause a decrease in Jokowi's credibility. With the decrease in credibility, Islamic Group 212 hopes there will be a decrease in Jokowi's popularity and electability in the 2019 presidential election. The disappointment of the Islamic group, which later joined 'the Islamic Group 212' towards Jokowi,

was due to several things. First, in reality, the president, who was also the governor of DKI Jakarta for the 2012-2017 period, was considered a representation of the interests of the PDIP. The group has made PDIP an ideological enemy for a relatively long time, especially since Megawati, the general chair of the nationalist party, became President of the Republic of Indonesia for 2021-2024. Yusuf Martak, Chair of Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Ulama (the National Movement to Guard the Ulama Fatwa), stated that 'the 212 Islamic Group' considered Megawati and PDIP to be implementing secular policies (interview on 9 May 2019 in Jakarta). Therefore, when Jokowi ran for Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2012, the Islamist group was in the opposing position because the figure who was then the mayor of Solo was considered an extension of PDIP's interests in Jakarta. According to Bachtiar Natsir, Chair of the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa, When Jokowi ran for Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2012, the Islamist group was in the opposing position because the figure who was then the Solo mayoralty was considered an extension of PDIP's interests in Jakarta (interview on 28 March 2019 in Jakarta).

Second, Joko Widodo is close to Islamic figures/organizations that are considered Liberal Islamic groups, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (interview with Said Aqil Siradj, General Chairperson of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board on 4 May 2019, in Jakarta). Liberal Islamic groups, including Nahdlatul Ulama, are considered by 'Kelompok Islam 212' ('the 212 Islamic Group') to spread Islamic teachings that mislead Islam. In addition, NU and Liberal Islamic groups are perceived as often countering the spread of Islamist teachings. In terms of religious paradigms, there are differences between NU and Islamic groups 212 Islamic Groups. NU is Indonesia's most prominent Islamic organization, and its teachings are moderate, inclusive, and tolerant of diversity (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020). In Islamic Boarding Schools and Schools affiliated with NU, education about moderation and religious tolerance has been provided (Tan, 2014). Therefore, NU makes it easy to dialogue, interact, and cooperate with different groups, including religious minorities (Barton, 2009). In reality, the debate about implementing an Islamic state with a secular one continues to occur in various countries (An-Naim, 2010a) (An-Naim, 2010b). Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is expected to be able to oversee and implement the principles and practices of democracy in Indonesia because, after all, NU is the most prominent Islamic organization in Indonesia. Thus, it is hoped that Islamic practices will be by democracy in Indonesia (Buehler, 2009).

Unlike the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (Liberal Islamic Group), 'Kelompok Islam 212' / 'the 212 Islamic Group' is more exclusive in implementing a diversity pattern. Therefore, they tend to be more closed to different groups. They have suspicions that the existence of different groups, especially those of different religions and ethnicities, has the potential to harm Islam. The 212 Islamic Group' has the perception that groups that are different in religion and ethnicity harm Islam not only spiritually but also economically. In this context, minority groups (especially Chinese business people) are considered to be one of the causes of the marginalization of the economy of Muslims (natives) (interview with Slamet Maarif, Chairman of Persaudaraan Alumni/PA 212 (the Alumni Brotherhood 212) on 28 March 2019x in Jakarta). Political Islam and Islamic Parties In Indonesia: Critically Assessing The Evidence Of Islam's Political Decline (Marlina et al., 2019).

The exclusivity of the 'Islamic Group 212' is marked by their desire to realize the concept of The exclusivity of the 'Islamic Group 212' is marked by their desire to realize the concept of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Sharia). A concept that believes that NKRI, Pancasila is the basis of the state, but the implementation of the values of NKRI (Pancasila) must be adjusted to Islamic Sharia. According to Al-Khaththath, Secretary General of Forum Umat Islam/FUI (the Islamic Community Forum), implementing Pancasila must be combined with teachings based on Islam (interview on 29 March 2019 in Jakarta). In this context, they believe that if there is a difference between Pancasila and Islam, Pancasila must be subordinated to Islamic Sharia. The concept of a State Based on Islamic Sharia, if implemented, is the same as discriminating against non-Muslim groups. Therefore, if the concept of an Islamic State based on Sharia is realized, it is the same as making non-Muslims a second-class group. In addition to the Republic of Indonesia Based on Sharia, there is also a desire from their sympathizers and members to fight for the caliphate system in Indonesia (interview with Ismail Yusanto, former Spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia on 7 October 2019, in Jakarta). Because of these desires, the 212 Islamic Group is often seen as intolerant (Hamudy, 2019).

Third, President Joko Widodo's policies are (considered) detrimental to Islamic groups. Several Jokowi policies are believed to be detrimental to Islamic interests. First, Jokowi's policies are considered not to reflect justice towards Muslims. Jokowi is considered to be so quick to accuse Muslims of being terrorists, and then the Muslims are arrested. On the other hand, the Wanda Brothers Group, non-Muslims, were not punished, even though they carried out terror in Papua. Second, Jokowi's policies are considered detrimental to foreign and foreign groups compared to indigenous Islamic groups. Third, Jokowi is considered to have slandered Islamic figures. The resistance of 'Kelompok Islam 212'/the '212 Islamic Group' against Jokowi or in the sense of their support for Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election, made the political contestation occur in a conflictual manner that divided society into two camps, namely pro and anti-Jokowi (M. M. Muharam et al., 2021). The struggle for political influence and public space also occurred between Islamic groups that support Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno and other Islamic groups that support Jokowi-Maruf Amin (Lubis, 2020). This division not only has the potential to create hostility between citizens but is also feared to be a threat to unity.

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The opposition of the Islamic Group 212 did not stop after Jokowi was elected as President for the 2019-2024 period, even though Prabowo, whom the group supported in two

presidential elections, became the Indonesian Minister of Defense. The Islamic Group 212 accused Prabowo of being a traitor because he chose to join the cabinet in Jokowi's government. Prabowo's action in choosing to join is the same as contradicting the wishes of the Islamic Group 212, which does not recognize Jokowi's government, because it is considered that the victory obtained was carried out with much cheating. After Prabowo joined the Joko Widodo government by becoming the Indonesian Minister of Defense for the 2019-2024 period, the resistance movement of the Islamic Group 212 experienced a decline. The movement of this group to oppose the ruler is getting stronger, with the support of many political forces, especially formal forces (parliament).

The 'Islamic Group 212 experienced a decline in movement, but they still have a critical attitude (opposition) towards the Jokowi government. It is difficult for most figures from the Islamic Group 212 to accept Jokowi's leadership because they have lost trust in the president, who began his career in government as the mayor of Solo, especially in the era of government. Disappointment with Jokowi and Prabowo is getting stronger because, in reality, the 2 important figures in politics and government have not resolved the problem of the killing of 6 (six) members of the Islamic Defenders Forum (Forum Pembela Islam/FPI) in the "Kilometer 50" incident in 2020. According to Abdullah Hehamahua, one of the figures of the '212 Islamic Group', 'The 212 Islamic Group was already disappointed when Prabowo betrayed them by joining the Jokowi government in 2019 since then they have found it challenging to trust Prabowo to defend Islam (interview on 5 August 2019 in Bogor, West Java)

'Disappointment with Jokowi and Prabowo, one form of which is manifested by giving support to the pair Anies Rasyid Bawesdan-Ahmad Muhaimin Iskandar. Anies Bawesadan is considered a figure who is more worthy of support than other figures because the Governor of DKI Jakarta for the 2017-2022 period has high electability and is considered to be able to represent Islamic interests. In this case, The Islamic Group 212 always identifies its interests as those of the people. This group always constructs that what they voice and fight for is the aspiration of the Islamic community. Efforts to win the Pair Anies Rasyid Bawesdan-Ahmad Muhaimin Iskandar, or in other words, defeat Prabowo-Subianto-Gibran Rakabumi, Rizieq Shihab or the elites of the Islamic Group 212 always use ulama as a tool of legitimacy to realize their interests. Therefore, the group gathered clerics from various regions throughout Indonesia to hold an event to support all political steps in the 2024 presidential election. In that case, the clerics who gathered were a political and religious network which had long been in contact with Shihab and the Islamic Group 212. The event, called the Ijtima' Ulama, resulted in several decisions, including supporting the Anies Rasyid Bawesdan-Ahmad Muhaimin Iskandar pair in the 2024 presidential election. One of the considerations in the decision to provide support emerged after Anies was willing to review the Kilometer 50 case, which caused the deaths of several FPI members if he was elected president (Anwar, 2024).

The existence of the Ulama Decree in the 2023 Ulama Ijtima event became a legitimacy tool for Rizieq Shihab (Habib Rizieq) and the Islamic Group 212 to declare to Muslims that the decision to support Anies Bawesdan-Ahmad Muhaimin Iskandar was carrying out the orders of the ulama (Sadat, 2023). The Ulama Fatwa was used as an instrument by Shihab and the Islamic Group 212' to gain support from Muslims throughout Indonesia and realize political interests.

The existence of the Ulama Ijtima' strengthened the Islamic Group 212 belief that its efforts to provide balanced resistance to Jokowi could be carried out. The 'Islamic Group 212' believes that in order for the Ulama Ijtima' to be accepted by Muslims, the Ulama Ijtima' is not only related to efforts to support specific candidates in the presidential election (pilpres). But the event must also be related to the moral movement to implement Islamic principles and values.

Therefore, in the Ulama Ijtima' the 13 points of the integrity pact were determined. The points related to politics are the implementation of TAP MPRS Number XXV of 1966 concerning the Dissolution of the PKI and the prohibition of the spread of Communism, Marxism, and Leninism as well as support for Palestinian independence. In the economic field, the Political Ijtima' wants economic sovereignty and efforts to maintain natural resources. In addition, no less importantly, the Integrity Pact determined in the Ulama Ijtima' contains the Indonesian Nation's commitment to a moral revolution.

The belief that the Islamic Group 212 can balance Jokowi's influence in the 2024 presidential election, in addition to the Ijtima' Ulama event, they also believe that Rizieq Shihab is a figure who has the magnet to gain support from Muslims. The belief that Rizieq Shihab has the magnet to influence Islam is based on the results of a survey from a well-known survey institution in Indonesia, namely Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), which stated that Shihab's electability level reached 1.6 to become president, very high, without campaigning for himself as a presidential candidate. The institution's findings on September 15-21, 2001, Rizieq's electability could match many officials and national figures, including Puan Maharani, Chair of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) (Berutu, 2021).

They believe that the Islamic Group 212 can balance Joko Widodo's influence in the 2024 presidential election, which makes them more enthusiastic about carrying out political movements and activities. The figures from the group actively voiced the importance of changing the regime and structure, which had been under Jokowi's influence. They considered that if Prabowo wins the presidential election, there is an open possibility that Jokowi will intervene in government governance. Therefore, for them, defeating Prabowo-Gibran, the pair supported by Jokowi, or winning Anies Bawesdan-Muhaimin Iskandandar, must be fought for to the maximum.

Efforts to win the 2024 presidential election were carried out in various ways by the Islamic Group 212, including actively conducting socialization (campaigns) at religious events (religious studies, Islamic Holiday Commemorations, especially in Jakarta. The Islamic group actively forms opinions through banners, etc., and information technology (social media and online media). They also actively hold meetings with Islamic scholars and organizations in various regions. These scholars and Islamic organizations are parties that have worked with Rizieq Shihab for a long time in political and religious matters. The stakeholders of the Islamic Group 212' in the regions are actively carrying out political work to win the Anies Bawesdan-Muhaimin Iskandar pair.

Islamic Group 212 has experience utilizing information technology (online and social media) for political interests. They have succeeded in making themselves a group to be reckoned with politically and religiously in recent years with the help of online media. And social media. Through online media and social media, they were able to gather hundreds of thousands to

gather in Jakarta in the "411" and "212" actions to make Ahok a prisoner (M. et al., 2020)(M. et al. et al., 2023). They can gather hundreds of thousands of people from all over the country and various community groups from various elements, and these groups become a place to channel the disappointment of economically marginalized people (Kusman, 2016).

The "212" demonstration on 2 December 2016, which was later known as the Islamic Defense Action, was disrupted by the state. The state did not want the event to be held on a large scale and attended by hundreds of thousands of people. In addition to persuading the figures of 'Kelompok Islam 212' / 'the 212 Islamic Group' not to let the event disrupt political stability, the state also tried to prevent participants from attending Jakarta. The state continuously pressured bus owners and train operators not to send participants to Jakarta. Because of this pressure, the departure of the demonstration participants to Jakarta was disrupted and almost impossible. This situation worried the 212 Islamic Group; they already thought many people would not attend the demonstration. However, optimism emerged because several people from Ciamis walked to attend the "212" action. The action carried out by several people from Ciamis was greeted enthusiastically by many people on every street they passed, and they provided food and drink to pedestrians. The walking action and the community's greetings went viral on social media and online, and many people learned about the action. Because of the viral action, they have then touched the hearts of many Muslims who want to go to Jakarta (M. et al. et al., 2023).

The role of information technology (online media and social media) also makes the existence of Islamic Group 212 an important factor in the 2019 presidential election. The existence of information technology makes it easier for 'the Islamic Group 212' to shape public opinion to the public throughout Indonesia and even the world. Therefore, the public can know what the group voices to counter the opinions expressed by Jokowi's supporters.

The discourse and movement resistance carried out by 'the Islamic Group 212' against Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election has made the political contestation occur full of chaos. This chaos has created political divisions in society, into parties that continue to confrontationally find fault with the government and parties that blindly support the ruling regime. Through online media and social media, the Islamist group ('Islamic Group 212') always states that if Jokowi is re-elected as president for the 2019-2024 period, Islamic interests will be ignored. On the other hand, the Pro Jokowi group states that if the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Mien Uno pair, the presidential and vice presidential candidates supported by the 'Islamic Group 212' win the 2019 presidential election, it can shake the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

The existence of information technology has provided extraordinary benefits for the Islamic Group 212 to "greet" residents from all corners of the country. Without having to have comprehensive branch management, and very few have management at the sub-district level, 'the Islamic Group 212', the opinions raised by the group can be known by citizens living in rural areas. In contrast, with the two most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two organizations have management in most villages in Indonesia. Hence, it makes sense that villagers can know their opinions. Because they often meet and meet face to face with villagers throughout Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)

and Muhammadiyah find it easy to mobilize the masses in religious, social, and political events. They can offer ideas of nationalism, pluralism, and religious tolerance (Ismail, 2011).

The ability and success of the Islamic Group 212 in using information technology to strengthen its existence cannot be separated from the fact that sympathizers and members of the group are students or graduates from majors at well-known campuses in Indonesia. It is not an exaggeration if these young people can use information technology as the most effective means to convey messages of resistance in an exciting and fast way to all corners of the country. According to Ulil Abshar Abdallah, a Muslim scholar who is a moderate Islamic figure, these young people are natives of the world of information technology; throughout their lives since childhood, they have used technological advances for the benefit of life (interview on 6 May in Bekasi, West Java). The ability of young people who sympathize with 'Kelompok Islam 212' / the 'Islamic Group 212' makes the existence of the group provide color in online media and social media coverage. For example, the group became the world's media darling in 2020 because the online media and information affiliated with them were as many as

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The youth are partly affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperous Justice Party); both organizations have followers who have engineering and natural science education backgrounds. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party) is a political party whose cadres come from well-known campuses in Indonesia, whose thoughts and militancy were formed in campus mosques (Woodward et al., 2013). The Prosperous Justice Party is also known as a party that spreads the idea of Islamism by having members who have a level of discipline to carry out orders. Therefore, party members are militant in carrying out organizational orders (Hamayotsu, 2011).

Impact on Democracy

The opposition carried out by the Islamic Group 212 has a positive impact on the practice of democracy. Amid the powerlessness of political parties against state pressure, and the weak strength of civil society in controlling the abuse of power, what they do makes the practice of checks and balances against the government still occur. With all the problems faced, such as legal threats against its figures, the 'Islamic Group 212' continues to try to create alternative discourses against the narratives put forward by the authorities.

The Islamic Group 212 believes that creating different discourses is part of a form of control over what is being done by the government led by Joko Widodo. For them, creating discourses and movements to remind people of the government's mistakes does not have to consider the impact. Even if the movements carried out do not significantly impact social change, for them, this is a risk of struggle. The group believes that exercising control over the ruler is part of worship therefore they have the principle that the struggle must be carried out while the results are God's will.

In addition to the narrative about religion, the 'Islamic Group 212' criticized the economic and legal policies made by the government led by Joko Widodo. For them, the

government led by Jokowi has created economic and legal injustice against the indigenous people (Muslims). For example, they criticized and demonstrated against the Draft Law (RUU) on Job Creation because the bill was considered to have harmed the labor group and, on the contrary, benefited entrepreneurs. This group also often voiced the control of the economy by Chinese entrepreneurs from within and outside the country.

Islamic Group 212 does not want only procedural democracy to be implemented in Indonesia, which only has elections held routinely, namely once every five years, or there are direct regional head elections (pilkada). They must want democracy to be implemented substantially, which is marked by equal treatment between citizens in every aspect of life, including in the economic and legal fields and the enforcement of Human Rights (HAM) (Glassman, 2019).

The activism of the 'Islamic Group 212' to become an opposition to the government led by Joko Widodo is in accordance with the practice of substantial democracy. But there are also those who worry that this activism will strengthen their existence. If their existence strengthens so that they become an influential group in the fields of religion and politics, there is concern that the discourse and movement of Islamism will increasingly dominate public life.

Some people consider the discourse and movement of Islamism to be too exclusive and prioritize the interests of Islam over other groups (Formichi, 2015). The success of the Islamist group is feared to make minority groups (non-Islam) a second-class group, marginalized in public life (social and political). Therefore, there is concern that the stronger the group's influence, the practice, and principles of democracy will decrease. Democracy, in principle, is characterized by equality and equal opportunities for citizens (regardless of background) to be actively involved and have access to public spaces (politics) (Diamond, 2015), but this has the potential not to happen if there is a desire from the Islamic group to demand excessive rights in power.

The desire of the 'Islamic Group 212' to offer the concept of "NKRI Based on Islamic Sharia," in the sense that there is a desire from this group to make Islam the primary source of the constitution, of course, this is not desired by minority groups (non-Muslims). Democracy is substantially respect for the existence of minorities. In other words, democracy does not want tyranny by the majority. The concept of "NKRI Based on Islamic Sharia," if implemented, is the same as ignoring the social reality of pluralism in Indonesia. Respect for pluralism is one of the essences of democracy.

Conclusion

'Kelompok Islam 212' ('The 212 Islamic Group') is an Islamist group that wants the glory of Islam in the social, political, economic, and religious fields. This group actively criticizes the government led by Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Even the opposition against Jokowi has been carried out since the President of the Republic of Indonesia became the Governor of DKI Jakarta. 'The 212 Islamic Group has been known to the public since holding a demonstration that brought hundreds of thousands from all over the country to Jakarta to demand that Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok) - the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time - be imprisoned for alleged blasphemy, on 4 September and December 2, 2016. The demonstration against Ahok was its

primary goal to discredit Jokowi because Ahok was considered an extension of the president's interests. The opposition against Jokowi was carried out by criticizing and demonstrating against Jokowi's government policies, including opposing Jokowi's desire to become president again for the 2019-2024.

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